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The Balance o.f Fo .r ces
and the Empire of Liberty:
States' Rights and the Louisiana Purchase
Robert Knowles*

This Article challenges the conventional wisdom about the
Louisiana Treaty and argues that it was unconstitutional. As many
students of history know, President Jefferson had serious misgivings about
its constitutionality, which scholars have dismissed as driven by an overly
strict construction of the Constitution. The Article concludes that Jefferson~
concerns were in fact motivated primarily by respect for federalism principles.

ABSTRACT:

This Article identifies and discusses the underlying conflict betwee.n two
radically different visions of federalism. While Jefferson s Republicans
believed that the incorporation of new states in the West would merely
expand the Constitutions form of government to more territory, creating an
"empire of liberty, '' the Federalists argued that it would destroy the delicate
regional balance of power preserved by the Constitution. The author
concludes that, given the federalism principles at stake, Jefferson ought to
have give:n more weight to the ''balance of forces" view and carried out his
plan for presenting a constitutional amendment.
This Article also contends that the consequences of,]efferson 's failure are
more serious than scholars have admitted. States' rights claims based on the
"empire of libetty" theory implicit in the Louisiana Treaty made the spread
of slavery inevitable. The failure to require an- amendment triggered a
decline in the use of the Article Five amendment process and set the stage for
a further weakening of states' rights. Finally, with potential threats to state
sovereignty on the horizon, the Article concludes that a narrow view of the
treaty power, consistent with the Supreme Court's recent revival of
federalism, would best preserve the constitutional principles weakened by the
Louisiana Purchase.

*

J.D., Northwestern, 2001. Law clerk to the Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Special thanks to Steven Calabresi, Robert
Bennett, Curtis Bradley, Hillary Krantz, Lee Howard, and the staff of the Iowa Law Review.
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INTRODUCTION

In grade school, many of us learned that President Thomas Jefferson
purchased the Louisiana Territory from Emperor Napoleon of France for
1
approximately eleven million dollars. We also learned that the Louisiana
· Purchase effectively doubled the size of the country, accelerating westward
expansion as vast new spaces opened for settlement on the western side of
2
the Mississippi River. As a political maneuver, the purchase was an elegant
solution to all of Jefferson's major foreign policy headaches. In one fell
swoop, the United States gained permanent control of the Mississippi River
and its tributaries and banished France a European power with whom the
3
U.S. had just fought an undeclared war from North America for good.
Jefferson was surely happy.
But what most of us learned later, or never at all, is that Jefferson

l.

Students like me who did not always pay attention in school could still learn about
such things from watching Saturday morning cartoons during the 1970s courtesy of
"Schoolhouse Rock." "Elbow Room," about westward expansion, conveyed the basic facts:
The President was Thomas jefferson,
He made a deal with Napoleon,
"How'd you like to sell a mile or two (or three or a hundred or a thousand?)"
And so in 1803 the Louisiana Territory
Was sold to us without a fuss
And gave us lots of elbow room.
The full lyrics are available at http:/ /www.apocalypse.org/pub/u/gillyI
Schoolhouse_Rock/HTML/history/elbow.html (last visited on Jan. 1, 2002) (on file with the
Iowa Law Review).
2. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT, FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 260 (1970).
From a legal perspective, Professor Malone's multi-volume biography contains the best in-depth
description of the circumstances surrounding the Louisiana Purchase and Jefferson's
conflicting views about it. See also 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 227-392 (Charles Scribner's Sons
1917) (1889); 4 IRVING BRANT, jAMES MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE 1800-1809, at 98-159,
(1953); FORREST McDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (1976). For a more
streamlined account, see MARsHALL SMELSER, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, 1801-1815, at 83103 (1968). The details of the negotiations with Napoleon, and the court intrigue involved, are
recounted in ALEXANDER DECONDE, THIS AFFAIR OF LOUISIANA ( 1976).
The most thorough examination of the constitutional issues remains EVERETT
SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE (1920). Like
others, I am in debt to Professor Brown's even-handed depiction of the debates on the
Louisiana Treaty in Congress and within the Jefferson Administration. Brown appears agnostic
regarding the ultimate constitutional issues, although it is my opinion that Professor Brown
thought the treaty constitutional. See infra notes 30~05 and accompanying text; see also Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251-55 (1 901) (Brown, J.) (one of the so-called "Insular Cases'-~). For
more recent analyses, see PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTlONAL
DECISIONMAKING 73-75 (3d ed. 1992); DAVID P. CORRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 95-114 (2001); DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 85-112 (1994). For discussion of these analyses, see infra Part IV.D.2.
3. MALONE, supra note 2, at 268.
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privately brooded over the Louisiana Treaty because he doubted its
constitutionality. "Our peculiar security is in possession of a written
Constitution," he wrote at the time to his close friend William Cary Nicholas.
"Let us not make it a blank paper by construction. I say the same as to the
opinion of those who consider the grant of the treaty making power as
4
boundless. If it is, then we have no Constitution." Jefferson's concerns
about exercises of the treaty power echoed the sentiments that drove Anti5
Federalist opposition to it during the state ratifying conventions. In their
view, the treaty power, even more than the don1estic federal powers
enumerated in the Constitution, eluded precise definition and presented a
6
special danger for believers in a federal government of limited powers.
Jefferson proposed to ease his troubled mind by calling for a
constitutional amendment to ratify the Louisiana Treaty, but he never
7
followed through with his plans. While historians of the nineteenth century
criticized him for this failure, twentieth century historians concluded that an
8
amendment was either unnecessary or impractical, or both. ·1n this Article, I
take Jefferson's doubts seriously, re-examine the Louisiana Treaty, and
conclude that it was indeed an unconstitutional exercise of the treaty power.
In letters to friends and colleagues, Jefferson expressed fears that the
Louisiana Treaty violated principles of strict construction: no provision in
the Constitution's text granted the federal government power to acquire
territory and to incorporate states into the Union. In Jefferson's time, this
9
omission was, in itself, sufficient to raise serious concern. But the landscape
of constitutional interpretation has changed so drastically since 1803 that
today's conventional wisdom is, as Professor Martin Flaherty observed, that
"no constitutional dispute was more important at the time, nor seemingly
10
more beside the point now, than the Louisiana Purchase."

4. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803). in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 247-48 (Paul Leicester Forded.~ 1899) [hereinafter JEFFERSON
WRITINGS].jefferson's concerns are discussed in depth in Part IV.C and IV.D.2.
5. See infra notes 39-63 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion o{ early fears about the treaty power, see infra Part II.B.

7.

For a discussion of Jefferson's proposed constitutional amendments, see infra Part

IV.D.

8.
9.

See infra Part IV. D.
'
See id. One historian referred to the Jeffersonian view of the Constitution's powers as
"retnarkably cramped.'~ CURRIE, supra note 2, at 105; see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 189 n.* (2d ed. 1996) (arguing thatjefferson's strict

views would leave "little room for treaties';). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 416 (1998).Jefferson's early views on the treaty power
were expressed in his Manual on Parliamentary Procedure, written when he was Vice President. See
infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
10. MartinS. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI.. L. REv. 1089, 1094 (2001) (reviewing
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THEjEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001)). No
one is arguing, it's safe to say, that South Dakota ought to be returned to France. Nor are the
precise constitutional issues confronting. Jefferson whether territory outside the original
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This Article explains why the conventional wisdom is wrong. More was
at stake in arguments about the Louisiana Purchase than resolving
disagreements between advocates of a very strict construction of the
Constitution and advocates of a more flexible one. As Jefferson's Federalist
opponents warned at the time, the treaty threatened the constitutional
principle that inspired jefferson's belief in strict construction states' rights.
When jefferson announced the Louisiana Treaty, a note of dissent rang out
11
from New England. The Federalists understood that, with vast new territory
would come new states, and that these new states, in the South and West,
12
would in all likelihood be slave states. The Reverend Manasseh Cutler
declared to a friend that the treaty was a "flagrant violation of the principles
13
of the Constitution." The admission into the Union of new states formed
from this territory would tilt the balance of political power to the South and
14
"lay the foundation for the separation of the States. "
The heart of the conflict between the Federalists and the newly
ascendant Republicans was a disagreement about the nature of the
Constitution itself. Both camps believed in federalism that the states and
15
the national government possessed sovereignty.
The Federalist

bounds of the United States may be acquired and incorporated by treaty to double the size of
the country likely to recur any time soon. There are no concrete plans (that this author is
aware of) either to acquire territory or incorporate territory through a treaty. But one never
knows. See john Ellis, Let's Buy Siberia: Don't Laugh, It's a Great Idea, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 1998,
at A27 (arguing that Clinton could have avoided impeachment by doing something as popular
as the Louisiana Purchase buying Siberia). At any rate, changes in the nature of the union
which threaten state sovereignty crop up as the United States participates in comprehensive
international agreements. See infra Part VI. Finally, a look at the issues raised by the
geographical expansion of the nation are worthwhile alone for what they reveal about the
Constitution and our government. See Sanford Levinson, 'Why the Canon Should be Expanded to
Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 251-57
(2000); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Our Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95
Nw. U. L. REV. 581 (2001) (discussing the case of Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164
(1854), which involved the legality of the American military government in California between
May 30, 1848, when the United States acquired the territory, and Sept. 9, 1850, when California
was admitted as a state).

See FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION 60 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Letter from Rufus King to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 4, 1803), in 4 LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 324-325 (Charles King ed., 1900), reprinted in BROWN, supra
11.

note 2, at 43 ("As by the Louisiana Treaty, the ceded territory must be formed into States ...
[and] will not the present inequality, arising from the Representation of Slaves, be increased?")
[hereinafter KING].
13. 2 WILLIAM PARKER CUTLER &JULIA PERKINS CUTLER, JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER 138 (1888).

14.
15.

/d.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)

(noting the States "fonn distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject,
within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to
them, within its own sphere."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999):
[A]s the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations
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interpretation which I call the balance of forces theory viewed the U.S.
Constitution as a means of maintaining equilibrium among competing
powers within society, and particularly among the geographical sections of
16
the United States. Although the balance of forces view had its roots in the
English Constitution, during the American Revolution the Patriots made it
their own, believing that "the very idea of liberty was bound up with the
17
preservation of this balance of forces." The introduction of new states in
the west threatened to upset the equilibrium that the Federalists felt was
necessary to maintain liberty.
In contrast, the Republicans, rejecting what they saw as an outmoded
European balance-of-powers model, instead imagined a much more
idealized Constitution, the principles of which should be applicable to a
nation of great size and diversity so long as equality among the discrete
states was maintained. The admission of new states in the West wou.ld merely
expand the republican form of government to more territory, creating an
18
"Empire of Liberty. "
Consideration of the battle between these two competing visions of
states' rights has been the crucial element missing from analyses of the
19
Louisiana Treaty's constitutionality. While early doubts expressed by
scholars were soon drowned in a chorus of approbation at the tremendous
benefit the treaty brought to the United States, little attention has been paid
to the adverse consequences for the federalism principles embedded in the

by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of
the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution,
and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the
Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan
of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.

16.

See JAMES M. BANNER, JR., To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION 27 (1970). For further
discussion of the balance offarces view, see infra Parts II.B and IV.B.
17. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 76
(Enlarged ed., 1992).
18. Jefferson first used the expression "Empire of liberty" in a letter to George Rogers
Clark. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, Dec. 25, 1780, in 2 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 390; see also PETER S. 0NUF, JEFFERSON'S EMPIRE: THE LANGUAGE OF
AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 65-70 (2000) [hereinafter ONUF, EMPIRE]; ROBERT W. TUCKER &
DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, EMPIRE OF LIBERlY: THE STATECRAIT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1990).
Professor Onuf highlights the difference between these two views of states' rights but sees the
balance of farces view as reflecting older, European conceptions of the world, and the empire of
liberty view as reflecting a newer, American conception. The names are my own. See Peter S.
Onuf, The Expanding Union, in DEVISING LIBER1Y: PRESERVING AND CREATING FREEDOM IN THE
NEW AMERICAN REPUBLIC 79 (David Thomas Konig ed., 1995) [he reinafter Onuf, Expanding
Union]. For more discussion of Onufs views, see infra text accompanying notes 339-53.
19. Even the earliest commentators, critical of Jefferson for abandoning his strict
construction of the Constitution, did not mention states' rights as a concern. See infra notes
285-91 and accompanying text. While Professor Onuf calls attention to the two competing
theories of federalism, he does not address the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase. See
supra note 18.
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20

Constitution and dear to the heart of Jefferson. In this Article, I contend
that Jefferson and the Republicans' empire of liberty undertnined federalism
itself. Under the structure ofthe Constitution, it is insufficient to guarantee
each state that it will exist on an equal footing with the others. In order to
respect the sovereignty of the states as well as the national government, the
states' approval must be sought through the constitutional amendment
process in which the states themselves share equal p-o wer in re-interpreting
the Constitution whenever profound changes in the nature of the union
may diminish the ability of existing states to have their interests represented
in the national government.
I make a historical argument for the importance of this view based on
the consequences of the Louisiana Purchase. Slavery frustrated the
Republicans' empire of liberty vision by demonstrating the growing strength of
sectional interests. The recognition of the Federalists, balance of forces
principles would have been critical for avoiding the Civil War. Instead, the
effort to contain slavery based on a balance offorces view ran head-on into the
popular sovereignty claims of Stephen Douglas and others, who merely
applied Jefferson's abstract empire of liberty federalism principles to the new
states in the West. As the empire of liberty triumphed, so did slavery. The
Louisiana Purchase marked the substitution of one kind of federalism for
another, resulting in a vastly diminished role for states in effectuating
constitutional change~
But more than bringing some much-needed balance to our view of
1
Jefferson s actions and their results, a fresh look at the Louisiana Purchase
may shed light on the current debate raging in the academy about
21
federalism and the Treaty Clause. As globalization an-d international
agreements regulate more pervasively in areas traditionally governed. by
22
domestic law, efforts are being made to square the Supreme Court's recent

20. Twentieth-century historians have been far more forgiving of Jefferson than their
nineteenth-century counterparts. See infra Part IV.D.
21. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L.
REv. 98 (2000); Martin S. Flaherty, Are We To Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1277 (1999); David ·M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Naticm:
The Histarical foundatilmS of the Naticmalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075
(2000); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 164547 (1999) [hereinafter Neuman, Liberties]; Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 33, 4~9 (1997) [hereinafter Neuman, RFRA]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1337-43 (1999); Thomas Healy,
Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv.
1726 (1998); Robert Knowles; Comment, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to

Globalim,ticm, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 735 (2001).
'22. See generally Lawrence J. Auerbach, Federalism In the Global Marketplace, 26 URB. LAw.
235 (1994);_Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1441. See
Bradley, supra note 9t at 396 409; John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constituticm: Treaties, N&n-SelfExecution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1967-75 (1999); Knowles,
supra note 21,. at 749-54.
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revival of federalism with its decision in Missouri v. Holland generally
2
believed to hold the treaty power immune from states' rights limitations. ;3
24
Amid today's proliferation of treaties, the Louisiana Purchase provides a
warning that even the most beneficial exercises of national power can
disrupt the federal-state balance in unintended ways.
Part II supplies some necessary background. I introduce the two distinct
views of federalism that formed the backdrop for the framers' design, the
balance of forces and the empire of liberty. The Louisiana Purchase is an early,
23. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In Holland, the Supreme Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty,
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 29 Stat. 1702.
Justice Holmes rejected Missouri's argument that the treaty power was limited in the same ways
by federalism as the commerce power: "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest
exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty
followed by such an act could ... ."Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. The Treaty did not "contravene any
prohibitory words" in the Constitution, and no "invisible radiation ... of the Tenth
Amendment" limited the scope of the treaty power. !d. at 433-34.
The Court has yet to overntle Holland, but it has in recent years strengthened states'
rights vis-a-vis other national powers. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(prohibiting suits in federal courts for violence on the basis of gender because Congress cannot
create such a cause of action pursuant to the Commerce Clause); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999) (holding that Maine state probation officers could not sue the state in Maine courts for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U .S.C. § 201 et. seq.); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting Congress's power to enact civil rights legislation
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(invalidating a statute commandeering state executive officials); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to
override states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a portion of the Gun Free Schools Act as exceeding
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
In light of this jurisprudence, some scholars have argued that Holland should be
overturned, or that its holding should be limited. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 274 ("If a particular law violates the Tenth
Amendment ... by placing an undue burden on state governments, then it is questionable why
the same action would be constitutional if undertaken through a treaty."); DANIEL A. FARBER ET
AL., CAsES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD
CENTURY 850 (2d ed. 1998); Bradley, supra note 9, at 456-61; Knowles, supra note 21, at 763.
However, most scholars believe the treaty power exception is justifiable. See HENKIN, supra note
9, at 442 n.2; Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning 4'Self-Executing"
and "Non-SelfExecuting" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 515, 530-31 (1991); Healy; supra note 21,
at 1731; cf Golove, supra note 21 (concluding from a historical study that few subject matter
limitations apply to the tr~aty power, although state sovereignty limits probably do apply).
24. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 6-27, S. Exec. Doc.
No. 95-2 (1978) (defining political rights); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 3, S. Exec. Doc. No. D. 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3
(guaranteeing rights of equal treatment in economic and social spheres); International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 4,
S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), at 1, 3-4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218-20 (entered into force Jan. 4,
1969) (outlawing hate speech); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, Introductory Note to Part VII, at 144 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RElATIONS] ("[H]ow a state treats individual human beings, including its
own citizens, in respect of their human rights, is not the state's own business alone.").
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but relatively unexplored, chapter in the long struggle between proponents
of broad and narrow interpretations of the Treaty Clause, waged in the halls
of Congress and in the academy, that continues today. But the purchase
prominently brought to the surface this deep conflict within federalism.
From the beginning, Anti-Federalists, and their Republican successors, had
expressed concern that the treaty power could be wielded by a rogue
executive and an aristocratic Senate to interfere with individual rights as well
as state laws and institutions. The principal fear, however, was that the treaty
power could upset the balance of forces by bargaining away southern states'
25
access to the Mississippi River. Th.e Treaty Clause was sold to the state
ratifying conventions with assurances that it would preserve, not destroy,
intersectional parity. By the time of the Louisiana Purchase, the two camps
had reversed roles: While the Anti-Federalist's nightmares imagined the
treaty power as a tool for short-circuiting the federal structure of the
Constitution, sweeping aside states' rights in the name of national foreign
policy prerogative, it was their successors, Jefferson's Republicans, who made
the boldest use of this tool during the Louisiana Purchase.
Part III provides an explanation for why this Article focuses so much on
Jefferson's conflict with himsel[ This unusual approach is justified because
Jefferson's influence was so strong that, during the Louisiana Purchase, the
strongest checks and balances were his constitutional principles.
With this backdrop, in Part IV, I analyze the constitutionality of the
Louisiana
Treaty
by
exa~ining Federalist objections to it, Jefferson's
.
.
concerns about it, and the congressional debates over it. I begin by
explaining why th,e Louisiana Treaty <;learly required the incorporation of
26
new states from foreign territory. I then examine the Federalist opposition
27
in New England.
As for the constitutionality of the treaty itself, while the acquisition of
territory inheres in the foreign policy powers of a sovereign state, and is thus
a permissible use of the treaty power, the authority to incorporate the
territory into the Union is essentially a domestic power that has the potential
to profoundly alter the relationship between the states and the federal
government. The Louisiana Treaty infringed on fundamentally domestic
matters that qught to lie beyond the scope of the treaty power. The
Federalists' constitutional objections., however motivated by politics or
·.

•

25. The conventional wisdom is that a treaty could not give away state territory. De
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (Field,].) (dictum) ("It would no~ be contended that
[the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids~ or a change in
the character of the government or in that of one of the states, or a cession of any portion of
the territory of the. latter, without its consent."}; see also HENKIN, supra note 9, at 193-94;
Bradley, supra note 9, at 426 n.209. But see Vasan Kesavan, The Treaty-Making Power and American
Federalism: An Originalist Prooffor Missouri v. Holland (tentative title) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) ..
26. See infra Part IV.A.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
•
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jealousy, were correct, and Jefferson should have followed through with his
plan to seek a constitutional amendment.
In Part V, I examine the consequences of the failure to ratify the treaty
with a constitutional amendment. First, the government's ability to control
the spread of slavery into the new territory proved inadequate in the face of
states' rights claims based on the empire of liberty theory implicit in the
28
Louisiana Treaty. Second, the failure to seek an amendment for such an
important constitutional change led to a decline in the use of the Article
Five amendment process; which gives the states an equal voice with the
29
federal government in constitutional changes. Instead, the Louisiana
Purchase set the stage for subsequent transformations outside of Article Five,
transformations in which the national government reconstructed the
constitutional regime in its own favor. Finally, in the Conclusion, I briefly
address why the lessons of the Louisiana Purchase should cast doubt on the
now-dominant "nationalist" view of the treaty power.

II. Two THEORIES OF FEDERALISM AND THE TREA1Y CLAUSE
Article II of the Constitution provides that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
30
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." A device neither for
lawmaking nor merely diplomacy, the power to bind the nation in contract
31
with foreign states has both executive and legislative aspects. It is a strange
beast. In an age of globalization, where treaties and other kinds of
international agreements continue to grow in their importance and impact,
scholars struggling to define the scope of the treaty power confront a
dilemma. On the one hand, treaties regulate the nation's dealings with
other countries, and therefore, as in other foreign affairs matters, the
32
federal government needs wide latitude. On the other hand, if treaties can

28. See infra Part V.A.
29. See infra Part V.B.
30. U.S~ CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
31. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 15, at 451 ("The power
in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to
the legislative nor to the executive."); 3 jOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1282 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) ("The treaty-making power,
therefore, seems to fonn a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to the
legislature, nor the executive, though it may be said to partake of qualities common to each.");
Id. § 1513; Bruce Ackennan & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV~ L. REv. 799,
808 (1995) ("The Founders established a very complex law-making machine: one system for
constitutional amendment, another for treaty-making, a third for statute-making.").
32. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936)
("The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our
internal affairs.''). However, Curtiss-Wright has been subject to withering criticism. See Michael].
Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtis-Wright?, 13
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regulate anything, the federal government may, in effect, legislate
domestically by treaty without being bound by the limits of its Article I
33
powers.
This dilemma is not new. In fact, the same debate about the scope of
the treaty power has been waged, with varying intensity, from the time the
Constitution was ratified. The system of government contemplated by the
34
Constitution was unprecedented. For the first time in history, a national
35
government shared sovereignty with the states. But then, as now, this
federal system ceases to function if the national government can use the
treaty power as a trump card. In the first subpart, I introduce two theories
about how the Constitution protects the States from the national
government which I refer to as the balance offorces and the empire of liberty.
As I discuss in the second subpart, the Framers had to account for both views
while drafting the Treaty Clause and seeking to ensure that the Constitution
would be ratified.
A.

THE BALANCE OF FORCES AND THE EMPIRE OF LIBERTY

Because fears of a tyrannical national government reflected concerns
about states wielding authority over one another, the Framers designed the
national government to minimize the danger that it could become a proxy
36
for the interests of any state or group of states. The structure of the
YALE J. INTL. L. 5 ( 1988); David M. Levi tan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. justice
Sutherland's Theary, 55 YALE LJ. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtis-Wright
Export Corporation: An Histurical Reassessment, 83 YALE LJ. 1 (1973).
33. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 425-26 (arguing that federalism limitations on Congress's
powers should be applied with equal force to the treaty power); Knowles, supra note 21, at 754
(reaching the same conclusion in light of the Supreme Court's revival of federalism and
globalization's in1pact on areas of law traditionally governed by the states).
34. James Madison told the Virginia Ratifying Convention that the Constitution's federal
structure "is in a manner unprecedented: We cannot find one express example in the
experience of the world: It stands by itself." JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 162 (1996); see also MCDONALD, supra note 11,
at 9 (observing that the new Constitution's federal system was "undreamed of in political
philosophy''). To European political philosophers, sovereignty was indivisible, and dividing it
was the self-contradictory concept of imperium in imperio. /d. at 1. Blackstone had declared that
"sove reignty and legislature are indeed convertible tenns" and "there is and must be" in every
state "a supreme irresistible, uncontrolled authority, in which ... the rights of sovereignty
reside." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44 (12th ed.).
35. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) ("By splitting the atom of sovereignty, the
founders established two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ("The Constitution ... , leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty ... reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment." (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 39 Qames Madison) supra note 15, at 245) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
36. Madison identified balancing the "interfering pretensions" of different "combinations
of states" as one of the three major categories of "difficulties inherent in the very nature of the
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Constitution sought to ensure that this would not happen through two
federalism safeguards: the composition of the branches of the national
government would protect a range of state interests, but if these "political
safeguards" failed, the powers of the national government would be
constrained, at least to the extent that they could encroach on state
•
37
sovereignty.
Nevertheless, this balancing of states' interests was even more
complicated than it initially appeared. The States, when considered in the
abstract, were political entities, each with (more or less) defined borders and
representative governments. From this perspective, the only salient
difference between Virginia and Rhode Island was population. Thus the
compositions of the House and Senate reflected the need to satisfy the
38
interests of states with, respectively, large and small populations. Beyond
this difference in representation, the States were guaranteed protections
designbd to ensure that the playing field among them remained level. Some
were explicit: Congress cannot favor the port of one state over another and
39
must guarantee to each a Republican form of government. The implied
limits on Congress's powers also protect each state from encroachment on
its sovereignty. With the exception of population size, all states would be
treated the same. This was empire of liberty federalism.
But the Framers were reminded, as the Philadelphia Convention wore
on, that States were more than mere political entities; they were, even in
1789, demi-Republics with unique institutions and folkways, comprising a
\\ride range of geographies, climates, and economic interests that resulted in
deep, often intractable, differences among them. In order to succeed, the
new Constitution would have to take these differences into account, to
balance these shifting forces so that none could assume unfettered
authority. This was balance of forces federalism. Reconciling it with the
abstract empire of liberty federalism would not be easy.
As James Madison came to recognize at the Convention, the most
significant cultural difference between the States was slavery. Madison's
earlier efforts at the Convention had emphasized building compromises into

undertaking referred to the convention." THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 267, 270-71 (James
Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961 ) .
37. See supra note 23. In Federalist 39, ~tadison described the complex ways that
representation in the new government under the Constitution ranges from national, to statebased, to mixed. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 36 at 280-86. For
theory that the political safeguards are the sole federalism protections afforded by the
Constitution, see jesse H. Choper, the Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability
of judicial Review, 86 YALE LJ. 1552 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of

.Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 ( 1954). For trenchant criticism of the "political safeguards" theory, see
Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 ( 1994).
38. RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 68.
39. See U.S. CONST. art. IV.,§ 4; U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 5.
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the Constitution that balanced states' interests in the· abstract, but he
becarne aware that it would not be enough. Madison broached the issue of
sectionalism, contending that the most material difference causing divisions
among the states resulted
partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having
or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the
great division of interest in the U. States. It did not lie between the
large and small States: it lay between the Northern and Southern,
and if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually
given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this
important truth that he had been casting about in his' mind for
40
some expedient that would answer the purpose.
Other compromises would be necessary. The most important was the
addition of the Three-Fifths Clause, which counted slaves as three-fifths of a
41
person for the purposes of determining representation in the House. As
the historian Jack Rakove points out, this revelation unmasked the tensions
in Madison's own theory of federalism. Which vision was correct? Was it,
when considered in the abstract, an empire of libcrt~a "society embracing a
'multiplicity of interests'" defined "in terms of the attributes of individuals"?
Or was it a nation depending for its stability on a balance of forces, "a nation
divisible into two great and potentially antagonistic factions, either of which
could readily imagine how shifts in population and influence might threaten
42
its prosperity, institutions, and values alike?" At the Convention, however,
neither Madison nor any of the Framers could afford to choose between the
balance of forces and th-e empire of liberty. The success of their enterprise
depended on ensuring that every exercise of national power would take
both theories of federalism into account.
The Treaty Power was no exception. In fact, the Anti-Federalists' efforts
to rewrite the Treaty Clause were rebuffed, and the Constitution was
approved, only with the understanding that the treaty power would preserve,
43
not disturb,. both kinds of state interests~ Although the requirement that
treaties be approved by two-thirds of those Senators present protected the
interests of the states in the abstract, empire of liberty sense, opponents of the
Constitution claimed that; despite this procedural protection, the Treaty
Clause would permit the national government to upset the balance of forces.
The concerns raised at the Constitution's origin foreshadow the subsequent
debate over the Louisiana Purchase. Just as the Anti-Federalists of th,e
ratification debates feared that the President and the Senate could violate
state sovereignty by bargaining away by treaty their territory and access to
supra note 34, at69;

40.

RAKOVE;

41.

ld.

42.
43.

ld. at 77-78.
See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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important resources, the Federalists feared the Louisiana Treaty would
diminish state sovereignty by diluting the ability of the original states to
advocate for their interests in Congress. Thus the two opposing sides voiced,
at different times, the same concern: that the treaty power would be used by
the national government to upset a delicate regional balance of power
between North and South. In the next subpart, I examine more closely. the
ways these concerns were initially assuaged.
B.

THE TREA1Y POWER, THE BAlANCE OFFORCES,

(

AND THEBA7TLEFORRAT[}1CATION
•

.
•

. From the :very beginning, Anti-Federalists warned that the Treaty Clause
delivered sweeping power to the national government that could overwhelm
the rights of individuals and states. These fears were rooted in the American
Revolution itself, which can be understood "as a defense of the rights of
popularly elected assemblies to enact internal legislation, free from the
44
dictates of a foreign affairs power exercised by a central government'-'
Patriot leaders argued that the "Crown granted the colonists the right to
regulate themselves in all internal matters, just as Parliament" regulated the
45
internal matters of Great Britain. The colonies operated under a de facto
system of divided sovereignty, with Parliament governing matters of tr~de
and commerce and the colonial legislatures governing matters such as
46
taxation. The Declaration of Independence itself suggests that Jefferson
and the other Founders understood the relationship between the colonies,
which it now called "states," and Great Britain to be essentially a "federal"
47
one, and thus governed by treaty.
Naturally, those who distrusted a strong national government focused
their attention on the treaty power. Moreover, the ways in which they sought
to limit it reveal the salience of balance offorces federalism. While the records
of the Convention and the Federalist papers contain little discussion of the
48
scope of the treaty power, a late effort at the Convention to modify the
Treaty Clause shows that genuine concern existed among the delegates that
the treaty power would be abused. Governor Morris introduced an
amendment that "no Treaty shall be binding on the U.S. which is not

Yoo, supra note 22, at 2004.
Yoo, supra note 22, at 2008; see jOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THEAUTHORI1YTO LEGISlATE 68-74, 11~25 (1991).
46. McDONALD, supra note 11, at 2.
47. See ONUF, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 56.
48. Bradley, supra note 9, at 410; see also Shackelford Miller, The Treaty Making Power, 41
AM. L. REv. 527, 529 (1907) ("At no time ... did the convention discuss the scope or extent of
the power; it merely considered the question as to where the power should be lodged who
should exercise it. The same is true as to the 'Federalist' .... ").
44.
45.
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49

ratified by a law." One of the purposes of the amendment, its supporters
claimed, was to guard against states using the treaty power to strike bargains
that would harm the interests of the minority of states. Wilson warned that
"under the clause, without the [Morris] amendment, the Senate alone can
make a Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some one
50
particular port" While Morris's amendment obviously did not prevail, it
indicated support for the view expressed earlier by George Mason, that "the
51
Senate ... could already sell the whole Country by means of Treaties.''
The scope of the treaty power did not emerge as a critical issue,
52
however, until the ratification debates~ Anti-Federalists launched a broad
attack on the Treaty Clause under the proposed constitution. They warned
that it gave the national government potentially limitless power. The
influential Federal Farmer obseiVed that "[t]his power in the president and
the senate is absolute, and the judges will be bound to allow full force to
whatever rule, Article, or thing the president and senate shall establish by
53
treaty .... " In Pennsylvania, Anti-Federalists used the unbounded nature
4
of the treaty power to support their proposal for a Bill of Rights. 5 "An Old
Whig" argued that "the president and two thirds of the senate have power to
make laws in the form of treaties, independent of the legislature itself, arid
could enter into a treaty "upon terms which would be inconsistent with the
liberties of the people and destructive of the very being of a Republic,n and
yet the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses "will give such a treaty the validity of a
55
law. " Patrick Henry delivered perhaps the most forceful and persuasive
arguments against the Treaty Clause during the Virginia Ratifying
56
Convention. He said, "[t]he Senate, by making treaties may destroy yo·u r
57
liberty and laws for want of responsibility." The dangers of the treaty power
were thought to be wide-ranging.

49. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 392-93 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS].
•
50. ld. at 393.
51. Id. at 297.
52. It was discussed by nearly all of the leading delegates, and the debates on the treatymaking power fill fifty pages of volume 3 of Elliot's Debates, or ten percent of the recorded
debates of the ratifying convention. :3 DEBATES .N THE SEVERAL STATE C9NVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT

1787, at 311-13, 316, 325-26, 331-66, 499-516, 609-10 Qonathan Elliot ed.,
1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]; Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause
of the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 297 (1934).
53. Letter IV from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE. DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 43-44 Qohn P. Kaminski & Gasparej.
Saladino eds.~ 1986) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
54. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2044.
55. An Old Whig III (Phila. lndep.. Gazetteer, Oct. 20, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 53. at 26.
56. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2067.
57. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53; at 965.
PHILADELPHIA IN

•
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In response, amendments were proposed to limit the force and effect of
treaties vis-a-vis other laws. A Pennsylvania amendment provided that "no
treaties which shall be directly opposed to the existing laws of the United
States in Congress assembled shall be valid until such laws shall be repealed
or made conformable to such treaties," and that treaties would not be valid if
"contradictory to the Constitution of the United States, or the constitutions
58
of the individual states." Importantly, according to the New York resolution
of ratification, New York ratified the Constitution with the understanding
that "no treaty ought to operate so as to alter the constitution of any state;
nor ought any commercial treaty to operate so as to abrogate any law of the
59
United States.~' The ratification debates also focused on the process by
which treaties might be approved, and what kinds of checks should be
60
placed on its exercise by the other branches. Among other things, the AntiFederalists insisted that there must be a formal role in the treaty-making
61
process for the House ofRepresentatives.
However, Anti-Federalist concerns about the treaty power were
grounded in the need to preserve the balance of forces: their deepest fears
arose from the possibility that the President and the Senate would pursue
62
the interests of one section at the expense of another. The development of
the West was thought to benefit the South because many of the settlers were
from southern families, the southern states would serve as a conduit for
western goods, and new western states would presumably share the South,s

2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53, at 598.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 409 (amendment proposed july 7, 1788).
SeeYoo; supra note 22, at 2047-74.
ld. at 2025. Professor John Yoo argues that the Framers intended that treaties would
effect without implementing legislation approved by the House of Representatives. See
generally Yoo, supra note 22.
62. While concerns over the Mississippi River seemed to have aroused more resistance to
the Constitution, the northern states had a parallel interest in preserving their access to the
Newfoundland fisheries. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 343 (remarks of William Grayson):
58.
59.
60.
61.
not take

It is well known that the Newfoundland fisheries and the Mississippi are balances
for one another; that the possession of one tends to the preservation of the other.
This accounts for the eastern policy. They thought that, if the Mississippi was given
up, the Southern States would give up the right of the fishery, on which their very
existence depends. It is not extraordinary, therefore, ... that they should wish to
preserve this great counterbalance.
•

/d.; 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 52, at 135 (remarks of Mr. Bloodworth at North Carolina
ratifying convention) (stating treaties will reflect the 'jarring interests of the Eastern, Southern,
and the Middle States" which "are different in soil, climate, customs, produce, and every
thing"); Golove, supra note 21, at 1134 n.l61; Warren, supra note 52, at 297; see also 2
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 548 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris) (referring to
"Fisheries or the Mississippi" as "the two great objects of the Union"); THE FEDERALIST No. 11
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 15, at 88 (referring to fisheries, Great Lakes, and Mississippi
River as "rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights of the Union").
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agricultural interests against the more industrial North. Yet, if the U.S.
failed to gain navigation rights to the Mississippi River, the western lands
would be closed off to development by the southern states because the
64
farmers in the West depended on the river to move their goods. William
Grayson, a former president of the Continental Congress an-d leading AntiFederalist lawyer, summarized the thinking of many: "[l]f the Mississippi was
yielded to Spain, the migration to the Western country would be stopped,
and the Northern States would not only retain their inhabitants, but
65
preserve their superiority and influence over that of the Southern." Since
the new Constitution required only two thirds of the Senators present
approve a treaty, should any Southern senators not be present, the Northern
senators and the President could push through a commercial treaty ceding
to Spain the navigation rights on the Mississippi. During a long critique of
the Con:s titution in the Virginia House of Delegates that lasted for two days,
Patrick Henry noted this risk, discussing at great length the mathematical
possibilities: "While the consent of nine States is necessary to the cession of
1
territory you are safe,' he said, but "if it be put in the power of a less
number,'' as with the Constitution, "you will most infallibly lose the
66
Mississippi." Even the procedural protections provided by the two-thirds
Senate majority requirement could not keep state interests safe.
Attacks on the treaty power and concerns surrounding the Mississippi
67
question started to turn the tide in Virginia against ratification. An
amendment proposed by delegates in both Virginia and North Carolina
frankly stated the balance offorces concerns that drove this rebellion:
no treaty, ceding, contracting, restraining or suspending the

See Lance Banning, Vi1ginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION 265 (Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989).
64. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2061-62.
65. Speech by William Grayson to the Virginia Convention Uune 12, 1788), reprinted in 10
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53, at 1192; see also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at
365 (remarks ofWilliam Grayson):
63.

I look upon this as a contest for empire. Our country is equally affected with

Kentucky. The Southern States are deeply interested in this subject. If the
Mississippi be shut up, emigrations will be stopped entirely. There will be no new
states formed on the western waters. This will be a government of seven states. This
contest of the Mississippi involves this great national contest; that is, whether one
part of the continent shall govern the other. The Northern States have the
majority,
and will endeavor to retain it. This is, therefore, a contest for dominion.
for empire.
/d.; id. at 501 (remarks of William Grayson) ("The prevention of emigrations to the westward,
and consequent superiority of the southern power and influence, would be a powerful motive
to impel [the Northern States] to relinquish that river.'').

66.
1788).
67.

9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53, at 1039 (Statement of Patrick Henry, June 7,
Yoo, supra note 22, at 2063.
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territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any of them, or
their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in the American
seas, or navigating the American rivers, shall be made, but in cases
of the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty
be ratified without the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole
68
number of the members of both houses respectively.
These complaints and proposals did not fall on deaf ears. As the battle
fo.r ratification continued, the Federalists sought to assure the opposition
that their fears were unfounded, In response to Patrick Henry's claim that
the "Constitutions of these States may be most flagrantly violated without
remedy," Edmund Randolph rose and responded that, "neither the life, nor
property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any State, can be affected
69
by a treaty." Even when considering a Constitution without a Bill of Rights,
James Iredell admitted to the North Carolina convention that the "power to
make treaties can never be supposed to include a right to establish a foreign
religion among ourselves,- though it might authorize a toleration of
70
others." Such assurances proved critical, tipping the balance in favor of
ratification in key states.
Madison led the effort to change the minds of delegates in his horne
state of Virginia. He advanced several arguments, including the observation
that the President, who represented the interests of the entire nation, gave
71
treaty-making a republican character. But Madison also assured the
delegates that " [ t] he exercise of the [treaty] power must be consistent with
the object of the delegation,; and that "[t]he object of treaties is the
72
regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and is external." Madison
then explained that the new Constitution would better protect the rights of
the larger states, such as Virginia, which relied on open access to the
73
Mississippi, than the existing Articles. Recognizing that the House had the
more republican character, Madiso·n stressed that the House would need to
74
pass implementing legislation before any such treaty would take effect.
Finally, addressing a point that concerned the delegates a great deal,
Madison, Edmund Randolph, and Wilson Nicholas assured opponents, at

68.

2 THE

DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION

562 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (hereinafter

DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION].

69. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5.3, at 1384-85 (state.ments of Patrick Henry
and Edmund Randolph).
.
.
70. 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 68, at 904-05-.

Yoo; supra note 22, at 2064.
10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53;. at 1396.
73. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2065.
74. See Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788) ~ in 2
THE CONSTITUTION, .supra note 68, at 443, 448.
71.
72.
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different points in the Virginia debates, that the law of nations forbade a
75
.
treaty that ced e d state territory.
In the end, Madison and his allies prevailed. The great achievement of
Madison and the other Federalists was in persuading enough delegates at
the Virginia Ratifying Convention to adopt the proposed Constitution,
without requiring additional procedural or substantive limits on the treaty
power, assuring them that balance offorces federalism had already been taken
76
into account. These pro.mises proved fleeting. Balance of forces federalism
would be seriously undermined by the Louisiana Treaty.
III.

JEFFERSON'S CONSTITUTION

This Article places a great deal of weight on the constitutional thought
of a single person, Thomas Jefferson. This may at first appear problematic.
Jefferson was not present at the Constitutional Convention; he was not one
of the Framers, and many historians and legal scholars seem to hold that
against him. Professor Joseph Ellis summed up this view in a recent jefferson
biography: when it came to the document he had no hand in writing,
77
Jefferson very often "didn't know what he was talking about." This may be
in some sense true, and I will not here tackle that issue, but during the
Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson became the most important interpreter of the
Constitution by virtue of his power. Despite the closeness of the 1800
75. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 345 (remarks of James Madison); id. at 357
(remarks of Wilson Nicholas); id. at 362 (remarks of Edmund Randolph) (noting that "[i]t
will ... be contrary to the laws of nations to relinquish territorial rights"). As Vasan Kesavan
argues, however, this does not mean that, under certain circumstances, a treaty could not cede
state territory. See Kesavan) supra note 25. Still, such a situation was virtually unthinkable: as
Madison said to the delegates, "the legislative authority to dismember the empire ... ought not
to be given, but by the necessity that would force the assent from every man." 3_EU.IOTtS
DEBATES, supra note 52, at 501. In such circumstances, one assumes that a constitutional
amendment could be obtained to approve something which could not be done through the
treaty power.
76. 3 ElliOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 352. Even their opponents acknowledged that
this was the goal: Patrick Henry declared that "[t]o preserve the balance of American power
[between the Northern and Southern States], it is essentially necessary that the right of the
Mississippi should be secured."
77. jOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHlNX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 330
(Vintage ed. 1998) (paraphrasing a statem~nt by Dolly Madison); see also MERRILL PETERSON,
jEFFERSON AND MADISON AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-2 (1987); Golove~ supra note
21, at 1188 n.352. Jefferson was serving as Ambassador to France, but he did correspond
frequently with Madison and Monroe during the Philadelphia Convention (even sending the
Constitution's primary architect a trunkful of philosophy books) and during the ratification
debates. See ELLIS, supra, at 114-25. Madison also approvingly quoted Jefferson's ''Notes on the
State of Virginia" when stressing the importance of the Constitution's separation Qf power in
avoiding tyranny. See FEDERALIST No. 48 Uames Madison), supra note 15, at 278-79. The special
relationship between Jefferson and Madison fonned a personal system of ''checks and
balances," and they influenced one another at key moments. ELLIS, supra, at 144 45.Jefferson's
views on the Constitution were either vague or complex, depending on your point of view. For
an in-depth treatment, see generally MAYER, supra note 2.
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presidential election in terms of the electoral vote; Jefferson entered office
on a Republican tidal wave that drowned Federalist opposition throughout
78
the United States. And once in office, Jefferson "was a stronger president
79
than either of his. predecessors tried to be." According to biographer
Dumas Malone, Jefferson's influence in Congress remained unmatched
until the Wilson administration, and Con:gress passed ''virtually no bills of
80
any significance" without jefferson's approval.
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court's bold move in -Marbury v.
Madison earlier that year, the Jefferson administration negotiated and
pushed the Louisiana Treaty through Congress without even mentioning the
prospect of the Supreme Court placing limits on executive or legislative
power. Regardless of what others said at the time and afterward, to a
remarkable degree, Jefferson's conclusions about what the Constitution did
81
or did not perffiit largely determined future practice.
Federalism. was, for Jefferson, the most important canon· of
82
Constitutional interpretation.. "The best general key for the solution of
.q uestions of power between o.u r governments," he wrote, is that "'every
foreign and federal power is given to the federal government, and to the
83
States every power purely domestic. "' Similarly, he wrote that " [w] he never
a doubt arises to which of these branches [state or federal] a power belongs,
84
I try it by this test." Jefferson understood federalism as the overall purpose
85
and design of the Constitution. A necessary corollary to Jefferson's
federalism was the strict interpretation of delegated federal powers, which
should be .c onstrued "according to the plain an.d ordinary meaning of it's
[sic] language, to the common intendment of the time, and of those who
86 s .
.
"
. was a bove a11 a means o f· protecting
.
· trict construction
states '·
f rame d It.
rights.
;

78.

See LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERS1JASION 278 n.l5 (1978).
79. /d. at 280.
80. MALONE, supra note 2, at 110. See also CURRIE, supra note 2, at 9; MALONE, supra note 2,
.at xv (Jefferson ''exercised influence on legislation which has been rarely matched in
presidential history").
·
81. Jefferson was aware of this as much as anyone. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 247-48 ("I think
it important, in the present case, to set an example against broad construction.").
82. MAYER, supra note 2, at 188-89.
83. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Robert J. Garnett (Feb. 14, 1824), in 10 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 295.
84.. Letter frorn Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 4, 1824), in 10 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 300.
85. MAYER, supra note 2, at 189. Jefferson called the Tenth Amendment the ~'foundation
ofthe Constitution." MCDONALD, supra note 11, at 24; U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution; nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reseiVed to the States respectively, or to the people.'').
86. Letter from Thomas jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 24, 1825), in 10 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 352.
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Jefferson did relax principles of strict construction once he was certain
the matter did not touch on states' rights. Professor David Mayer points out
that Jefferson could "espouse a fairly liberal theory of interpretation
embracing even implied powers. This was especially so in the realm of
foreign affairs, which he regarded as an exclusive responsibility of the
87
national government since the time of the Articles of Confederation.''
88
Jefferson felt free to use executive authority when acting overseas.
But jefferson did not view treaties as just any exercise of foreign affairs
powers. Like the early Anti-Federalists, he knew that the scope of the Treaty
Power was potentially vast, and that treaties could implicate domestic
matters. This became apparent during the nationwide controversy over the
Jay Treaty with Great Britain. Negotiated by the high Federalist john Jay, the
treaty contained many provisions objectionable to the Republicans,
including a clause permitting British citizens owning lands in the U.S. to
89
devise or sell them without forfeiture. Throughout the country, Jay was
burned in effigy and a flood of articles condemning the treaty were
.
h
d.
90
bl
pu ts . e 10 newspapers.
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, both of whom violently opposed
91
the treaty, engineered the fight against it in Congress. Jefferson viewed the
Jay Treaty as a partisan attempt by the pro-British faction to entrench
themselves in power in defiance of public opinion and popular
92
sovereignty. While other Republicans charged that the treaty was
unconstitutional because it violated the rights of states by interfering with
their property laws, Madison, for the most part, stuck to the position he had
taken during the rati6cation debates all those provisions normally
requiring the assent of both houses of Congress would require the approval
93
of the House to take effect. The Federalists insisted that the treaty was selfexecuting.94 In any event, the issue became academic once the House voted
•

87. MAYER, supra note 2, at 215.
88. ELLIS, supra note 77, at 240-41. Ironically, Jefferson used the navy he had opposed as
Secretary of State to pursue the Barbary Pirates when he became President. /d. at 241. Jefferson
aggressively. pursued commercial treaties with other nations, and sought to limit state
interference with them, under the Articles of Confederation, and later on in his presidency.
Golove, supra note 21, at 1130.
89. The Jay Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr~ Brit., in 2 TREATIES, AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 245, 253-54 ( 1931).
90. SeeGolove, supra note 21, at 1164.
91. /d. at 1178.
92. ld. at 1155.
93. See, e.g., James Madison, Jay's Treaty, Speech in the House of Representatives (Mar. 7,:
1796), in 16 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 141, 254 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter
MADISON PAPERS]; Golove, supra note 21, at 1183.
94. Golove, supra note 21, at 1126.
.
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51 to 48 to carry the treaty into effect amid fears that failure would lead to
95
the collapse of the government.
Jefferson expressed himself :m ore forcefully than Madison when it came
96
to the treaty power. He demonstrated legendary contempt for it, writing to
Madison: "I see no harm in rendering (the House's] sanction necessary, and
97
not much harm in annihilatin,g the whole treaty making power. " Later,
when he b.e came Vice President, and thus President of the Senate, Jefferson
published his views on the treaty power in the Senate's Manual of
98
Parliamentary Practice. First, he pointed out that a treaty "must concern
99
the foreign nation, party to the contract, or it would be a mere nullity."
Second, he wrote that treaties can only be used on '" objects which are usually
regulated by treaty," and, even then, only when those objects "cannot be
100
otherwise regulated."
Third, treaties cannot cover "those subjects of
legislation in which [the Constitution] gave a participation to the House of
101
Representatives. " He added, "This last exception is ,d enied by some, on the
ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on.
102
The less the better, say others." Finally, turning to states' rights, Jefferson
concluded that the Constitution "must have meant to except out of these the
rights resetVed to the States; for surely the President and the Senate cannot
do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any
. ,,103
way.
•

95.

/d. at 1156; jERALD A. COMBS, THE jAY TREA1Y: POLITICAL BAITLEGROUND OF THE

179-87 (1970).
96. Professor Go love concludes that jefferson's views during the early 1790s changed from
a broader to a narrower interpretation. See Golove, supra note 21, at 1178-79. One possible
explanation, other than simple political considerations~ was that jefferson began to see the ways
that treaties could infringe on domestic, and state, prerogatives. The Jay Treaty, if it did not
confirm his existing views completely, in all likelihood pushed him further toward the view that
the treaty power should be as limited as practicable.
97. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 27, 1796), in 16 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 93, at 280.
98. Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice § 52, in 1 The WRITINGS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON 335, 441 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
99. ld. at 442.
100. Id.
101. ld.
102. /d.
103. Jefferson, supra, note 98, at 335. While Jefferson's summary in the Handbook certainly
reflects a stricter view of the treaty power than that of his Federalist opponents, it is not at all
clear that his views were out of the mainstream. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 416 ("Both the
subject matter and federalism- limitations he suggested [in his Manual of Parliamentary
Practice] appear to have been consistent with the prevailing views of the time.t'). Jefferson
insisted that he did not differ from Madison or other Republicans. MAYER, supra note 2, at 23334. Professor David Colove believes that Jefferson's views were idiosyncratic and were largely an
attempt to rankle the Federalists in the wake of the Jay Treaty controversy. See Golove, supra
note 21, at 1188. But nothing that transpired during the Jay Treaty controversy actually proved
Jefferson's views to be in error. The House did finally agree to implement even the
FOUND INC FATHERS
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Jefferson believed that it was dangerous for the national .government to
exercise the foreign policy powers in a way that might give it a domestic
advantage over the States. This was particularly true with regard to
expanding the size of the United States. In fact, this. is the topic that first
inspired him to articulate the empire of liberty theory of federalism. How could
the rights of the states be protected? Any new territory should enter the
Union as a state, or not at all. He feared that large expanses of federally
controlled territory would lead to the aggrandizement of the national
government at the expense of the states. A group of colonies or client states
104
in the West could be wielded against :the original members of the Union.
Jefferson wrote that, "[c]ontrary to the principle of Montesquieu, it will be
seen that the larger the extent of country, the more firm its republican
structure, if founded, not on conquest, but in principles of compact and
105
equality."' Those two principles were key. The formal ability of "states to
engage in the compact was the essential condition for creating a true
106
union." But he meant the ability of new states to join the compact on an
even footing with the old. Jefferson's empire of liberty theory was born.
Finally, Jefferson believed that states' righ-ts could be protected by the
frequent use of Article V, which ensured that States retained an important
role in the prpcess of changing the Constitution. This went hand-in-hand
with the principles of strict construction. Jefferson strongly believed that the
people should participate as much as possible in resolving constitutional
107
q·u estions.
The English Whig political philosophers, whom Jefferson
studied and admired, criticized the English constitution because it lacked a
method for ensuring that the sovereign voice of the people would be
108
he~rd. James Burgh wrote in his Political Disquisitions that "the ,p eople
ought to provide against their own annihilation. They ought to establish a
regular and constitutional method of acting by and from themselves,
109
without, or even in opposition, to their representatives, if nec.essary. " For
Jefferson, Article Five the constitutional convention provision in
particular presented a good answer, and this persuaded him to support the
Constitution. Article Five was, he wrote, a means by which "the people might
recurr [sic] to first principles in a Regular Way, without hazarding a

controversial provisions, and so there was no opportunity to test Jefferson's claims in the
Handbook. And, if we accept the Handbook as a true guide to Jefferson's views on the treaty ·
power, it explains why the Louisiana Purchase seemed to trouble him so much.
104. 0NUF, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 39.
105. /d. at 118.
106. ld.
107. MAYER, supra note 2, at 314.
108. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 323
(1969).
109.. ld. (quotingjames Burgh).
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110

Revolution in the Government." Article Five thus brought Whig theory to
the world of practical political reality, and for Jefferson, this important safety
valve ensured that the Constitution remained relevant to the concerns of the
Ill
d ay.
A quick survey of Jefferson's constitutional interpretation would not be
complete without a caveat. The man who believed that the Constitution
should be narrowly interpreted also developed an exception that made strict
construction possible. Jefferson, in a letter to a friend in 1810, articulated a
constitutional necessity defense for higher officials ''when the safety of the
112
nation, or some of its very high interests, are at stake." He then outlined
some of the situations in which this doctrine of executive prerogative had
113
been applicable. This way, when criticizing overreaching by the national
government, Jefferson could continue to advocate forcefully the principles
of federalism and strict construction while justifying his own and others'
114
departure from them when it suited the interests of the nation.
The
burning question, as far as the Louisiana Purchase is concerned, is whether
Jefferson's exception effectively swallowed the rule.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALI1Y OF THE LOUISIANA TREA1Y

Under the Louisiana Treaty, the United States engaged in two
unprecedented activities it acquired territory from another nation and
incorporated that territory as states. Neither of these powers are explicit in
the text of the Constitution. As to the first activity, it now seems obvious that
while the acquisition of territory raised concerns among Federalists and
troubled,J efferson, it was so inextricably intertwined with the foreign policy
powers of the nation that even strict constructionists of the time could
reasonably believe that the treaty power encompassed it.
15
However, America's system of government was also unprecedented .•
This is why the incorporation of states into the Union by treaty raised
116
troubling questions never before addressed.
The U.S. Constitution

110.
111.
112.

MAYER, supra note 2, at 299.

Id.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson toJ.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS jEFFERSON 421-22 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellergy Bergh eds., 1904)
(hereinafter jEFFERSON WRITINGS (LIPSCOMB)).
113. See id.
114. See ELLIS, supra note 77, at 192 (contrasting the views of jefferson and Madison). Ellis
concluded thatjefferson's remarks -concerning theJay Treaty demonstrated "greater willingness
to bend constitutional arguments to serve what he saw as a higher purpose .... Upsetting
delicate constitutional balances or setting dangerous precedents did not trouble him in such
moments." /d.
115. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
116. Given the unprecedented nature of the federal system established by the Constitution,
it is dearly not sufficient to argue that the national government has the power to incorporate
new· teiTitory as states merely because the European monarchs had the power to acquire
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established a federal system in which the national government shared·
17
sovereignty with the states! H,ow would the existing states' sovereignty be
affected if the national government introduced new states into the Union?
The Federalists and the Republicans offered different answers to this
question, and the answers shaped their reactions to the Louisiana Treaty~·
Under the Republicans' abstract empire of liberty view of federalism, the
admission of new states merely meant expanding the federal system to new
geographical areas. In contrast, the Federalists' balance offorces view held that
the introduction of new states could. upset the balance among competing
interests, which the Constitution had been designed to preseiVe, and upon
which individual freedom and prosperity depended. As I argue in the
second Part, and in the rest of the Article, the successful expansion of the
United. States depended on the ability and willingness of those in power to
take both views into account.
This Part proceeds in four subparts. The first provides the backdrop:
what did the .Louisiana Treaty actually do? The policy of the United States
government since before the Constitution had been· to enshrine statehood
as the inevitable status of all territory. Because Jefferson and his
administration believed firmly in this policy and wished to avoid permanent
colonial fiefdoms, I conclude that the Louisiana Treaty required that the
acquired territory would eventually be incorporated as new states. The
second part describes the public opposition to the Louisiana Treaty in. New·
England, where Federalists declared the Purchase unconstitutional on
balance of forces federalism gro·u nds. The third part examines a threshold
issue: whether the national government, under the Treaty or the New States .
Clauses, actually had the power to acquire the territory in the first place.
Finally, the fourth part discusses the thornier question: at what point does
the incorporation of new states threaten the rights of the existing states?
•

.

A.

.

THE LO·UISIANA TREATY AND THE ADMISSION OF NEW STATES
•

•

The Louisiana Purchase was the surprise ending to a foreign policy
crisis that began when Jefferson tried to address the perennial concern of

territory. Nonetheless, this argument was advanced by Republicans during the debate over the
treaty.
, See, e.g., 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 448-49 {Oct. 1803) (statement of Rep. Elliott) (arguing.
.
that the Treaty Clause should be read as providing the same powers possessed under the-law of
nations, citing Vattel,
Grotius,
and
Puffendorf,
as
well
as
others
to
establish
the
right
to
acquire
.
territory by treaty).
·
117. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) ("By splitting the atom of sovereignty, the
founders established two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who su~tain it and are
governed by it." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ("The Constitution ... leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty ... reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment." (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 15, at 245) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
.
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•

the southern and western states preserving free navigation on the
118
Mississippi River.
Events moved so swiftly, and the opportunity was
presented to Jefferson so suddenly, that he had relatively little time to
consider the appropriate steps under the Constitution to carry out such a
significant change in the composition of the United States.
In 1795, the United States signed the Treaty of San Lorenzo with Spain,
which owned Louisiana and the Floridas, securing free navigation on the
119
Mississippi. American merchants could sail the length and breadth of the
river and deposit their goods in New Orleans pending export without paying
120
custom duties; in a few years they came to believe these were their rights.
But in 1800, Spain secretly agreed to cede the province of Louisiana back to
France. While Spanish officials had granted Americans even more access
than the treaty called for, France was considered to be a much harsher
121
neighbor, the most "rapacious" and "aggressive"
of
the
great
powers.
News
.
of the secret agreement slowly leaked out during 1800. Making matters
worse, in a move considered by other Spanish officials in the New World to
be a violation of the Treaty of San Lorenzo, the Spanish Intendent in New
Orleans closed the deposit in 1802, leaving Americans without a place to
store their goods. This precipitated a political crisis in America, which called
122
for an immediate response from the Jefferson administration. Rufus King
believed that France had obtained Louisiana in an effort to weaken the
Union because it was "the opinion of influential persons in France that there
was a natural line of separation between the American people on the two
123
sides of the mountains."
Jefferson, for whom an important and growing base of his political
support lay in the West, moved quickly to resolve the crisis. He appointed
Robert Livingston and James Monroe to negotiate with France to secure the
124
rights of Americans to navigate the Mississippi. The instructions called for
making the river the boundary between the United States and Louisiana and
125
for acquiring New Orleans and the Floridas for the United States. The
126
House voted to appropriate two million dollars for the task. Senator Ross
of Pennsylvania introduced a resolution urging the President to seize the
27
same territory by force! Only four months later, ljvingston and Monroe

118. For a discussion of these concerns, see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
119. MALONE, supra note 2, at 239.
120. /d.
121. /d. at 240.
122. /d.
123. !d. at 249.
124. BROWN, supra note 2, at 9.
125. Id. The details of the negotiations with Napoleon, and the court intrigue involved, are
recounted in DECONDE, supra note 2.
126. McDONALD, supra note 2, at 66.
127. /d. at 95-96.
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wrote from Paris, announcing that France had offered to sell the U.S. the
.
.
f
L
.
.
12s
enure proVInce o . ouisiana.
Jefferson responded speedily to this happy surprise. He and Madison
wrote back to approve the deal, w·h ich called for a payment to France of
$11,250,000 in six per cent stock and the assumption of claims of American
129
citizens against France totaling $3,750,000.
Although the precise
boundaries of the territory were unknown, Jefferson knew that the treaty
would give the United States control over the Mississippi and its
.
b
.
130
trt u tar1es.
. But the portion of the treaty that 'vould arouse the most interest, and
the most controversy, was Article III, which seemed to require that the
territory of Louisiana be admitted into the Union as a state or states:
The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the
Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible,
according to the principles of the Federal constitution, to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens
of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
131
property, and the religion which they profess.
Despite the seeming clarity of the words "incorporated" and "admitted,''
evidently some confusion existed about the legal effect of the provision. One
contemporary writer suggested that there were three possibilities regarding
the Louisiana territory's status: it could enter the Union immediately as a
state or states; it could be ,c onsidered a territory like the Indiana and
Mississippi Territories, which were part of the original United States, but not
yet states themselves; or, it could be a colo,n ial "fiefdom" of the U.S., similar
32
to Canada and Jamaica in relation to En,g land!
However, an examination of the longstanding federal government
policy with regard to the open lands in the West, and Jefferson's own views
on the status of territory, strongly indicate that Article III meant precisely
what it said. Since the very beginning of the Republic, it was widely assumed
that territories could look forward with certainty to statehood and admission
133
to the union. There was very little doubt that this would hold true for the
.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

.

supra note 2~ at 13.
MALONE, supra note 2, at 302.
BROWN,

/d. at303.

Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, Apr. 30; 1803, art. Ill, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 200, 202.
AlLAN B. MAGRUDER, ESQUIRE POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL AND MORAL REFLECfiONS, ON
THE LATE CESSION OF LOUISIANA, TO THE UNITED STATES 95 (1803).
133. PETERS. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION 108 (1987). This is no longer true. In the
Insular Cases, the Supreme Court distinguished between "incorporated" and "unincorporated"
territories. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901) (plurality opinion) (holding
that Puerto Rico is "unincorporated" and thus Article I, § 8, cl. 1, requiring "uniform duties
throughout the United States," does not apply to it, meaning Congress has the power to

370

88 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[2003]

Louisiana Territory as it had for the already-existing. territories.
When Congress be:g an serious planning for the future of the West in
early 1784, Jefferson headed the committee and drafted a charter for
134
temporary government of the western territories.
This plan, the ''1784
ordinance," set the boundaries for sixteen new states in the area north of the
Ohio River and in the western regions of original states that would cede
135 Th
·
·
. d th e new states a d..mission
. .
some o f t h etr territory.
-e ord.tnance promtse
to the union when their respective populations became equal to that of the
136
smallest existing state. What is striking about the ordinance is that it links
statehood and settlement so closely together; Jefferson essentially felt that
137
statehood was simultaneous with the process of settlement. Jefferson
wanted to avoid at all costs the establishment of a colonial regime in the·
West, which he believed would be a source of power for the national
138
government. Thus the existence of states was taken for granted.
Congress grew concerned with the disappointing results, however, and
a committee, headed by James Monroe, was appointed to revise the
ordinance. One concern was that the high degree of autonomy granted
settlers under the 1784 ordinance was stifling growth through lack of law,
139
order, or the clarity of land titles. In addition, the ordinance's plan for a
large number of small states alarmed Easterners who, already fearing that
their influence in Congress would decline in favor of the Republicans and
western interests, planned to raise the population requirement for statehood
'

regulate territorial tariffs in a way it could not if Puerto Rico were a state). Under this dual
regime, incorporated territories could look forward to :e ventual statehood, whileunincorporated territories could not. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 246. The conclusions
reached in the Insular Cases have shaky foundations. See id.:

But no one can plausibly believe that Downes was decided as a detached,
dispassionate exegesis :of prior opinions. The doctrine of "unincorporated
territories" ... was the product ... of the perceived exigencies of the moment,
which made Puerto Rico and the Philippines at once highly desirable as
possessions of the United States yet, it was thought, unsuitable for genuine
membership in the American Union.
For further criticism of the Insular Cases and the limbo status of territories. such as Puerto Rico,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam, see JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO
RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985). There is very little evidence that the
concept of unincorporated territories had much support at the time the Louisiana Treaty was
negotiated. Certainly, Jefferson would have hated the idea. See infra notes 134-38 and
accompanying text.
134. ONUF, supra note 133, at 46.
135. ld. at 46-47.
136. /d. at 46.
137. 1d. at 54.
138. /d. at51.
139. ONUF, supra note 133, at 50.
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140

to an impossibly high number. Without enough population, then, these
inchoate states might remain at territorial status indefinitely.
The result of Monroe's efforts, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
established territorial governments but nonetheless retained the promise of
statehood from the original 1784 ordinance .. It also set forth the boundaries
of potential states. The final section of the Ordinance announced, "The
following articles shall be considered as articles of compact between the
original States, and the people and States in the said territory, and forever
remain unalterable, unless by common consent .... " The Fifth Article
provided that "[t]here shall be formed in the said territory, not less than
141
three, nor more than five States .... " Monroe assured Jefferson, who was
then serving in Paris as Ambassador to France, that establishing temporary
territorial governments would actually facilitate Jefferson's principles
because it would speed up population growth and ensure the quick
142
attainment of statehood. Edward Carrington wrote to Jefferson that the
main purposes of the Northwest Ordinance were to establish "a Temporary
Government" in the West and provide "for its more easy passage into
,143
permanent State Governments.
Although the Northwest Ordinance separated the concept of statehood
from settlement, it nonetheless enshrined statehood as the preferred,
indeed inevitable, status of any territory held by the federal government.
Moreover, unlike Jefferson's 1784 ordinance, which required the assent of
nine of the existing states for admission, the Northwest Ordinance would
simply conjure new states into existence when the population reached the
144
sixty thousand threshold. The Ordinance also seemed to bind the national
government in a way that earlier plans had not. The Compact section of the
Ordinance, in particular, indicated that its writers intended for it to have
"constitutional" effect in the sense recognized at the time of the
Revolution that it was a compact between the United States and the
145
sovereign settlers in the territories. A territorial delegate, Paul Fearing,
told Congress in 1802 that the Ordinance "compact is the Supreme Law of

140. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (July 16, 1786), in 8 LETTERS OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 390-94 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1921-36)
[hereinafter CONGRESS LETTERS].
141. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 52-53 (amended 1789); Letter from James
Monroe to Thomas jefferson (July 16, 1786), in 8 CONGRESS LETTERS, supra note 140, at 390-94;
0NUF, STATEHOOD, supra note 133, at 52.
142. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786), in 8 CONGRESS
LETTERS, supra note 140, at 359-60.
143. Letter from Edward Carrington to Thomas jefferson (Oct. 23, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 252-57 (Boyd et. al. eds., 1950-) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS].
144. ONUF, supra note 133, at 59.
145. /d. at xviii. For the concept that the revolutionaries considered constitutions to be
"compacts" or "treaties," see WOOD, supra note 108, at 259-305; DonaldS. Lutz, From Covenant to
Constitution in American Political Thought, PUBLIUS, Fal11980, at 101-30.
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146

the land, and is in the nature of a treaty."
As late as the 1820s,
commentators such as William Rawle assumed that the Ordinance bound
the United States to recognize a territory's right to gain admission to the
147
.
h
.
h
.
I
d
d"
.
U n1on w en It met t e st1pu ate . con 1t1ons.
The understanding of the Northwest Ordinance as a constitutionally
binding document collapsed by 1850 when the U~S. Supreme Court
declared that it had been "superceded" by the Constitution, and that it had
148
no legal force.
Nonetheless, it articulated settled government policy
toward the territories at the time Monroe and Livingston negotiated the
Louisiana treaty's terms in Paris. If anything, the new Republican
administration favored the admission of new states at a faster rate than
149
.
d
'
b
'
h
0
d.
requtre . y t e r tnance.
This policy was reflected in the instructions Monroe and Livingston
received from the Jefferson administration. Madison wrote in the proposed
treaty that "to incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with
the citizens of the U ni:ted States on an equal footing ... it is to be expected,
from the character and policy of the United States, that such incorporation
150
will take place without unnecessary delay." In explaining this provision,
Madison wrote in the instructions that the only reason for not immediately
incorporating the inhabitants of any ceded territory was that they may be
entitled to "consent to the act of cession," which he fully expected them to
do.I5t
With the policies of the Northwest Ordinance as a backdrop, it is clear
that Article III of the Louisiana Treaty bound the United States to
incorporate Louisiana into the union. The Louisiana Treaty was, like the
Northwest Ordinance, a compc:tct with the residents of the territory that
promised they would become full citizens of the United States. Even though
the treaty did not set any timetable, nor did it, like the Ordinance, promise
statehood upon the achievement of any particular population, there is no
reason to believe Article III was not taken as seriously as the provisions of the
treaty in which the United States pledged to pay France for the cession.
Indeed, the three major agreements that made up the treaty, as historian
Alexander DeConde obsetved, ''formed one transaction and were

146. 11 ANNALSOFCONG. 1103 (speech of March 30, 1802).
147. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (De
Capo Press 1970) (1829); seealso3 STORY, supra note 31, at 160.
148. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82t 95--96 (1850).
149. See ONUF, s?.lpra note 133, at 59-61. Ohio had been admitted to statehood while the
Louisiana Treaty was being negotiated, and "the broad consensus" was that "the Ordinance and
not the Constitution governed Congress' authority with respect" to its admission. CURRIE, supra
note 2, at 94.
150. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1101 (1802-03).
151. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, in BROWN, supra note 2·, at 66.
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152

interdependent.''
Since territory was then considered merely to be a
transitional phase in preparation for the imminent achievement of
statehood, the Louisiana Purchase meant the admission of an unknown
number of new states into the Union.
B.

THE BALANCE OF FORCES: }EDERALIST OPPOSITION IN NEW ENGLAND

. Despite the widespread popularity of the Louisiana Purchase, the treaty
raised alarm bells in New England, the last bastion of Federalist influence.
Struggling to articulate why the treaty violated the Constitution, the
Federalists ironically summoned the same balance of forces federalism
principle that inspired their opponents, th~ Anti-Federalists, during the
ratification debates. The consequences of the treaty were more than just
political, New Englanders concluded. The Constitution did not permit such
a sweeping transformative act because it ignored the understandings upon
which the Constitution itself had been ratified.
In his History of the United States, Henry Adams wrote that, when the news
of the Louisiana Treaty was announced on July 4, 1803, "the Federalist
orators ... set about their annual task of foreboding the ruin of society amid
the cheers and congratulations of the happiest society the world then
153
knew. "
But the reality is that, in general terms, the cession of the
Louisiana territory to the United States initially met with approval even in
the strongholds of Federalism. The Newburyport Herald announced that
''[t]his province will prove a valuable acquisition to our growing empire ....
We pleasurably yield a tribute of praise for one meritorious transaction of
154
the present administration." Even Jefferson's most vociferous critics could
see the benefits.
Only after the precise terms of the treaty became known did New
Englanders begin to fear its consequences. The criticism centered on the
disadvantages to the northern states. The Herald worried that the purchase
155
would lead to considerable emigration from east to west.
In other
northern newspapers, critics complained about the deal's expense, arguing
that it would cost nearly all of the gold and silver coins in the United States
and would be funded ''not on the ,g ilt carriages of Virginians, or on the
whiskey of Kentucky and Tennessee; but on the opulence of the middle, the
156
industry and enterprise of the northern states~" Those who opposed the
treaty also thought it poor foreign policy. The Federalists believed that

152.
153.

DECONDE,

supra note 2, at 171.

1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 358 (Library of America

1986).
154. NEWBURYPORT HERALD, july 1, 1803; HaiVey Putnam Prentiss, Timothy Pickering as
the Leader of New England Federalism (1932) (unpublished dissertation, Northwestern
University).
155. NEWBURYPORT HERALD, Aug. 6, 1803.
156. SALEM GAZETTE, Aug. 16, 1803. See also COLUMBIA SENTINEL, July 20, 1803.
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Republican plans to expand the Union westward were foolish because the
result would be a huge, sparsely populated nation unable to govern itself or
157
.
b
d
muster th e resources necessary to secure Its or ers. I n h.Is d.tary, S. enator
William Plumer articulated these concerns, writing that "[a] n extension of
the body politic will enfeeble the circulation of its powers [and] energies in
.
, 158
.
th e extreme parts. ·
Moreover, Federalists suspected that France stood to benefit more than
the United States, and that the treaty had been not a little the result of
Jefferson and his Republican friends' love of France and its radical version
159
of democracy.
Such suspicions· were easily aroused in Federalists, who
nearly always favored closer relations with Britain than France. One
newspaper published a memo by Livingston containing anti-British
160
references, and some had described Livingston as a ''rankjac~bin." In the
Columbian Centinel, "Fabricus" saw the purchase as evidence of the power of
161
French influence in the United States. By making such a deal with France,
the U.S. had become a tool in the imminent war between France and Great
162
Britain.
This was also the sentiment of the young Federalist political
leaders. Fisher Ames called the transaction "mean and despicable" and
believed that Monroe and Livingston willingly played into the hands of the
163
French. "The cession of Louisiana," wrote George Cabot to Rufus King,
was like "selling us a ship after she is surrounded by a British fleet. It puts
164
into safe keeping what she could not keep herself .... "
Still, the attention of the Federalist community focused most closely on
Article Ill, requiring the incorporation of the territory into the Union,
which all assumed meant the admission of new states in the South and West.
The loss of political influence would be so profound that the nature of the
165
union itself had been irrevocably thanged.
In August, the Ner.vhuryport
.

.

.

157. SeeOnuf, Expanding Union, supra note 18, at 74.
158. See WILLIAM PLUMER'S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE,
1803-1807, at 6 (Everett Somerville Browned., 1923) [hereinafter PLUMER].
159. See MALONE, supra note 2, at 295~96. Of course, Napoleon would not have been willing
to sell Louisiana were he not convinced it was the best he could do for France. He perceived~
quite correctly, that the Jefferson administration had been engineering· a potential
rapprochement with Britain, and he felt something needed to be done quickly to halt it. ld. at
294-95. By .c eding Louisiana, Napoleon would remove the one area of conflict between the U.S.
and France. !d. In addition, Napoleon's earlier plans to send a military expedition to Louisiana
had gone up in srnoke when yellow fever dechnated the contingent of French soldiers in St.
Dorningo who had been assigned the task. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 63-67.
160. MALONE, supra note 2,, at 298.
] 61. THE COLUMBIAN CENTINEL,july 20, 1803.
162. /d., July 23, 1803 ("Who does not sicken at such baseness and folly? To give tnone.y to
France at this ti1ne is to strengthen the world's worst foe at a moment when its best friends are
entitled to every help.''-).
163. ] WORKS OF FISHER AMES 323 (Seth Ames ed., 1854) [hereinafter AMES].
.
.
.
164. HENRY CABOT LODGE, LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT 331 (1877).
165. Prentiss, supra note 154, at 69.
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Herald had declared that "the cession of Louisiana will cause, in effect, a
Revolution in our country, and a complete alteration of its political powers
166
and in.f luences must take place. " According to "a Merchant" in the Atlantic
Daily Advertiser that November, the treaty had <::aused_ "an unfortunate
167
change in the system of our policy, if not in our form of government.''
Although these complaints made clear the widespread alarm about loss of
political influence, they never articulated a cogent theory as to why it should
be unconstitutional.
That task was for William Plumer of New Hampshire, a young, reformminded Federalist leader in the United States Senate who, along with John
Quincy Adams and others, sought to remake the Federalists into a more
168
popularly oriented party. ln his diary, Plumer set forth in some detail what
he saw as the constitutional problems with Article III of the treaty many of
them the ones that, during the same period, troubled jefferson.
First, Plumer focused on the assumption, shared by Federalist
colleagues, that Louisiana was in essence a foreign country. Wondering why
Napoleon had insisted on the provision in the treaty requiring
incorporation, Plumer mused "that their admission would create an
influence in his favor in the Councils of our nation. What could induce our
Ministers to agree to an article in direct opposition to the spirit [and] genius
169
of our Constitution?"
The Constitution, Plumer believed, never
contemplated "the accession of a foreign people," and the New States Clause
only applied to the existing territory of the United States when the
.
.
.fi
d
170
Constituuon was rau te .
Plumer then advanced the balance of forces view of federalism through
the metaphor of a trading company. Just as a firm could not admit new
partners without the consent of each of the old partners, Plumer reasoned,
neither can a new state "formed from without the limits of the original
territory'' be admitted ''into the Union without the previous consent of each
171
T o perm•t
· provinces
.
. country to b-e a d m1tte
. d by treaty
"
State.
o f a £ore1gn
would "immediately change both the forms [and] the principles of our
government" because "the influences and votes of the old states would be
172
controuled and negatived by the new.'' "If we can admit Louisiana," he
166. NEWBURYPORT HERALD, Aug. 9, 1803.
167. THE NEWBURYPORT HERALD, Nov. 25, 1803. The Salem Gazette had reasoned earlier that
month that " [ t] he weightiest argument against [the treaty] is not the money price, but ... that
it would drain the population, and injure the interests, of the present confederacy. The
Western People dance on account of the purchase; but the Atlantic States must pay the piper."
SALEM GAZETTE, Nov. 15, 1803.
168. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: THE
FEDERALIST PAR1Y lN THE ERA OF jEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 44-45 (1965).
169. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 7.
170. Id.
171. !d. at 8.
172. ld. at 8-9 (emphasis in original).
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concluded, "why not the British provinces, why not the tenible Republic of
173
France itself!" Admitting Louisiana "of itself a worlr!' would "destroy
with a single operation the whole weight [and] importance of the eastern
174
•
h.
l
f
t•
.
"
states In t e sea eo po ttlcs.
Next, Plumer compared the addition of new states required by th.e
Louisiana treaty and the potential use of the treaty power that had most
troubled Anti-Federalists in the state ratifying conventions.
If the President [and] Senate can by treaty purchase new territory
[and] stipulate that it shall be incorporated into the Union,
without the previous consent of each of the old States why may
they not by treaty, sell a State, [and] sever it from the union,
without its consent?

ln making this argument, Plumer returned to the basis of fears that
'
animated criticism of the .treaty· power from the beginnin.g. The Northerners
now thought of something like Patrick· Henry's mathematical possibilities
whereby a supermajority of states could bargain away the rights of western
175
states to navigate on the Mississippi River through the treaty power. This
time, however, the shoe was on the oth,e r foot. It was the New Englanders
who imagined that their votes in the Senate would be swamped by the tide of
votes from the Senators of the new, Republican western states.
Moreover, new slaveholding states in the South and West would enjoy
disproportionate power in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral
College due to the operation of the Three-Fifths Clause, which counted
176
slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation. As early as
1803, "New York and New England had about sixty thousand more free
inhabitants than did the entire slaveholding South, yet the South had
thirteen more s-e ats in the House of Representatives and twenty-one more
177
electoral votes." This imbalance would increase if the Louisiana Territory
178
were incorporated. Despite the good fortune for the nation as a whole, the
impact upon individual states would be powetful. The fears about the treaty
power that haunted Anti-Federalists during the Convention had returned.
C.

THE POWER TO ACQUIRE 'TERRITORY

In October of 1803, Jefferson presented the treaty to the Senate for
179
ratification, a task that was accomplished in four days.
Aftetwards,

173. /d. at 9.
174. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 9 (emphasis in original).
175. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text (discussing fears that the Treaty Glattse
granted to the federal government powers that are too broad).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, d. 3.
· 177. MCDONALD, supra note 11, at 60.
178. ld.
179. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 95.
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Jefferson invited the House and the Senate to enact implementing
legislation, seeking to allay one of the significant concerns expressed by
180
opponents during the debate over the Jay Treaty.
The implementing
legislation authorized the President to take possession of the province,
appropriated money, and extended federal statutes to the new territory.
Congress divided the area into two parts: south ·of the thirty-third parallel,
the present northern border of the state of Louisiana, would be the territory
181
of Orleans. North of that line would be the Louisiana Territory.
The
182
.
fi
.
1·
1
1·
ratt tcation vote sp 1t a ong party tnes~
But even before the congressional debates, Jefferson conducted his own
debate with his conscience and with his closest advisors. The first issue
PresidentJefferson confronted, when he learned of France;s offer to sell the
Louisiana territory, was whether the federal government could
constitutionally admit new territory into the United States. This issu.e proved
to be the less problematic, and while Jefferson had reservations about it, the
consensus view -even given the relatively strict interpretation of federal
power common at the time was that the foreign affairs powers of the
national government included the ability to acquire territory because it was a
necessary part of conducting foreign policy. Thus the treaty power clearly
included the power to acquire territory.
The Constitution does not explicitly vest the federal government with
the power to acquire new territory. However, Article Four, section three
183
provides for the admission of new states into the Union. The Articles of
Confederation, in Article Eleven, had provided for the automatic admission
of Canada into the union, but "no other colony shall be admitted into the
184
same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine states."
Evidence from the Convention suggests that some, though certainly not
all, of the Framers believed new states would only be carved out of the

•

180. ld. For a discussion of the Republicans' Criticism of the Jay Treaty, see supra notes 89103 and accompanying text.
181. /d.
182. BROWN, supra note 2, at 13.
183. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3, cl. 1
New states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States
shall be fonned or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
ld. Another potential textual source for the power to acquire territory is the subsequent clause,
authorizing Congress to "dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
territory or other property belonging to the United States ... " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, d. 2.
But there is no evidence that the Framers had the acquisition of territory in mind when drafting
this clause. In Sere v. Pitqt, 10 U.S. (2 Cranch) 332, 336 (1810), Chiefjustice Marshall, writing
for the Supreme Court, assumed that Congress possessed the power to acquire territory and
looked to this clause simply to confirtn that Hthe power of governing and of legislating for a
territory is the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire and to hold territory."
184. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION, art. XI.

.,
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existing territory of the United States. Edmund Randolph's "Propositions in
the Federal Convention," known as . the "Virginia Plan," called for the
185
"admission of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States. ';
An early report of the Committee of Detail proposed that new states
soliciting for admission into the United States "must be within the present
186
limits of the United States," although the word "present" was omitted from
87
a later report.l By contrast, Patterson's New Jersey Pia~ merely stated that
"provision ought to be made for the admission of new .states into the
188 N
189
.
"
d.
d
Al
d
H
·1
;
1
.
d
·
h.
l"
.
.
U nton.
. or · 1
exan er . amt ton s p an Inc .u e t ·JS Imitation.
The draft of the Constitution reported by the Committee of Five
•
imposed the tightest restrictions on
the
admission
of
new.states.
It
contained
.
:
an article providing that new states "lawfully constitute~ or established within
the limits of the United States, may be admitted by the legislature into this
government; but to such admission the consent of two-thirds of the
190
members present in each house shall be necessary~" This language most
closely resembles the text of Article Four, section three. Obviously, however,
the final language contains no two-thirds majority requirement and,
importantly, imposes no territorial limitation. Gouverneur Morris said that
the ·ch1use was left vague on purpose, deferring more precise interpretation
191
of the· phrase for later.
The question was still unresolved when Jefferson first considered
proposing a deal with France to buy New Orleans and Florida so that the
U.S. could. effectively control the Mississippi River. Jefferson knew that
expanding the territory of the United States was politically complicated, so
he asked his cabinet for advice. Attorney General Levi Lincoln wrote to
Jefferson suggesting a means by which the question could be avoided:' the
existing ·State of Georgia and the Territory of Mississippi would simply
expand their borders to include the desired territory along the Mississippi to
New Orleans, thus abrogating the need for the fede,ral government itself to
1·

•

185.

~ ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 52, at 144-45; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49,

at 22.
186. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, 147.
187. ld. at 173.
188. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 177.
189. BROWN, supra note 2, at 16.
190. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 229_;30 (emphasis added).
191. BROWN, supra, note 2, at 16. In THE FEDERALIST No . 43, Madison said only that it made
sense to provide for the admission of new states and to protect existing ones against involuntary
alteration. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), supra note 15, at 273-74. The acquisition
of new territory probably was not much on the Framers' minds. The greatest controversy in the
discussion of the New States Clause was whether it permitted the existing states to be divided.
For analysis of the meaning of the Clause with respect to this thorny problem, see Michael
Stokes Paulson & Vasan Kesavan, Is West Virginia Constitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 291, 334-95
(2002). See also Kesavan, supra note 25.
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acquire territory.
"By this indirect mode," he wrote to Jefferson, "would
not the General Govt avoid some constitutional, and some political
embarrassments, which a direct acquisition of a foreign territory by the Govt
193
of the United States might occasion?~'
As a New Englander; Lincoln was in the best position to predict the
nature of the opposition from the northern states to the federal
government's acquisition of, and creation of new states from, the purchased
territory. He reminded Jefferson of the balance offorces federalism costs. ''Is
there not danger," he wrote, that the northern states would object
to the ratification of a treaty directly introducing a state of things,
involving the idea of adding to the weight of the Southern States in
one branch of the Govt of which there is already too great jealousy
[and] dread, while they would acquiesce in that increase of the
other branch consequent on the enlargement of the boundaries of
?194
a Sta t e.
Lincoln's implication was that expanding the representation of
so_u thern states in the House of Representatives was preferable to adding
southern seats in the Senate, which could be coerced by some future
President into further expanding by treaty the nation's borders southward,
thus adding new slave states indefinitely:
.

The principles, and the precedent, of an indepen·d ent purchase of
territory~ it will be said, may be extended to the East or West Indies,
and that some future executive, will extend them, to the purchase
of Louisiana, or still further south, [and] become the Executive of
195
the United States of North and South America.

Even though northern states wanted access to the Mississippi River, Lincoln
196
concluded, they would not be willing to pay so high a price for it.
But Treasury Secretary Gallatin rejected Lincoln's idea, arguing to
Jefferson that there was, in terms of the constitutional difficulties, "no
difference between a power to acquire territory for the United States and the
197
power to extend by treaty the territory of the United States." The issue
must be faced head-on, Gallatin thought, and he reasoned that the power to
acquire territory derived from the treaty power itself. He noted that the
clause providing for the admission of new states did not require that new
states be catved from existing territories of the U.S., nor did the provision

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Letter from Levi Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson, in BROWN supra note 2, at 18.
/d.at19.
/d.

!d. at 20.
/d.
1 ALBERT GALLATIN, WRITINGS 111-14 (Henry Adams ed., 1879) (emphasis added).
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granting Congress the power to legislate for the territories refer specifically
'
h
.
.
.
198
to t e extsttng territory.
Jefferson responded to this analysis by returning to the principle of
strict construction. Although he appears to have at first cautiously approved
of Gallatin;s argument with regard to the acquisition of territory, Jefferson
clearly balked at the id~a of admitting new states formed from that territory
into the union:
You are right, in my opinion ... [that] there is no constitutional
difficulty as to the acquisition of territory, and whether, when
acquired, it may be taken into the Union by the Constitution as it
now stands, will become a question of expediency. I think it will be
safer ·not to permit the enlargement of the Union but by
. c
.
.
199
amen d ment o f t h e onstttutton.
If the text did not so pro~de, it generally should not be done.
Once it became known that Napoleon was willing to sell all of
Louisiana, Jefferson became even more convinced, concluding that a
constitutional amendment was necessary both to acquire territory and to
form new states from it~ What probably cemented jefferson's feelings on the
issue was the enormous size of the territory to be acquired from France,
which, according to historian Dumas Malone, "magnified and accentuated
200
the constitutional question [s] ." Jefierson saw in the vast territory the
potential transformation of• national politics with the addition of new states .
At any rate, he announced his conviction th~t a constitutional amendment
was required in communication with a number of people, including his sonin-law Thomas Randolph; prominent Virginian politician William Dunbar;
renowned Massachusetts antilegalist Benjamin Austin; elder statesman John
Dickinson, who had worked with Jefferson on the Declaration of
Independence; the rising Republican congressional star, Kentuckian John
201
Breckinridge; and even, apparently, the Federalist William Plumer.
Because the treaty was ratified and implewented so quickly, opponents
'
of the treaty did not have time publicly to express their views regarding the
202
constitutionality of acquiring territory.
However, a few Federalists
expressed serious doubts privately, and along the lines predicted by Attorney
General Line-oln. Manasseh Curler and George Cabot warned that the
admission of new territory to the South and West would diminish the
.

.

'

198.
199.

Id.
Letter from Thomas Jetierson to Albert Gallatin Uanuary 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON
WRITINGS,.supra note 4; at 241 n.L
200. MALONE, supra note 2, at 313.
201. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 23-25.
202. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 101.
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203

influence of New England.
Fisher Ames complained that, by adding
territory beyond the Mississippi River, "we rush like a comet into infinite
space. In -o ur wild career, we may jostle some other world out of its orbit, but
204
we shall, in every event, quench the light of our own." Senator Plumer
expressed doubts in his diary, writing that, "The constitution of the United
States was formed for the ,e xpress purpose of governing the people who then
& thereafter should live within the limits of the United States as then known
& established. It never contemplated the accession of a foreign people, or
205
the extension of _territory.'' Yet later in the same diary entry, Plumer
seemed to admit that the United States probably did have the power to
206
acquire territory, either by conquest or acquisition.
Perhaps the most candid assessment of the Framers' intent came from
Gouverneur Morris, who wrote that, when drafting the New States Clause,
the strongest reason against adding language restricting the future territory
of the United States had been the fact that it would fly in the face of public
demand~ "I knew as well then as I do now," Morris wrote, ~'that all North
America must at length be annexed to us. It would, therefore, have been
perfectly Utopian to oppose a paper restriction to the violence of popular
207
sentiment in a popular government." Sharing the popularview,Jefferson's
advisors and friends did not seem to agree with him that the treaty power
208
could not extend to even the acquisition of territory.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in 1828 that the federal
government has the power the acquire territory as an adjunct to its authority
209
to conduct foreign policy. In American Insurance Company v. Canter, Chief
Justice Marshall declared that "(t]he Constitution confers absolutely on the
Government of the Union the powers of making war, and of making treaties;
consequently, that Government possesses th-e power of acquiring territory,
210
either by conquest or by treaty."
Indeed, a supporter of the Jefferson
administration had justified· the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory strictly
in foreign policy terms: had the French maintained control
of
Louisiana
and
.
colonized it further, the United States would have been forced to maintain a
'

203. See George Cabot to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 10-, 1803), in LODGE, supra note l64t at
333-34; Manasseh Cutler to Dr. Torrey (Oct. 31, 1803), in 2 CUTLER & CUTLER,. supra note 13,
at 138.
204. Letter from Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore (Oct. 3, 1803), in 1 AMES, supra note
163, at 323--24).
205. See PLUMER, supra note 158, at 7.
206~
Id. at 12.
207. 3 jARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GoUVERNEUR MORRIS 185 (1832).
208. See MALONE, supra note 2, at 314. However, as noted above; New Englander Attorney
General Levi Lincoln shared jefferson's doubts. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
209. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter~ 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
•
210. Id; see also 3 STORY, supra note 28, § 1282 ("As an incidental power, the constitutional
right of the United States to acquire territory would seem so naturally to flow from the
'
sovereignty confided to it, as not to admit of very serious question.").
·
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211

standing army along the lengthy mutual border. Jefferson's reservations
about this power, however, particularly when he learned of the size of the
purchase, undoubtedly stemmed from the likely result of the acquisitionthe incorporation of Louisiana into the United States as states.
D.

THE PO~"'R TO INCORPORATE FO&/GN TERRITORY AS STAT~"'S

When the Louisiana Treaty was concluded, most believed that the
United States had the power under the Treaty Clause to acquire foreign
territory in order to secure its own borders and preserve access to the
Mississippi River. This power arguably flowed from the need of any
sovereign nation to defend itself. But once the newly-acquired territory
opened for settlement, the inquiry shifted from the scope of the national
government's foreign affairs power to an alternative power to alter the
domestic relationship among the states, and thus to transform the nature of
the Union itself. Settlement inevitably meant new states, and new states
would mean new Senators and Representatives in Congress. Knowledgeable
observers could easily see dozens of new states emerging from this huge
territory, and the Federalists of New England accurately feared that the new
states would be Republican, and that they would side with the interests of
the South.
This subpart examines whether the treaty clause provided the federal
government authority to incorporate new states from foreign territory a
question that not only divided Republicans and Federalists, but also divided
Jefferson himself.
•

1.

The Debate in Congress

Facing a popular president with strong majorities in both houses of
Congress, the Federalists needed to persuade some of their Republican
colleagues that the treaty would violate the Constitution. The Republicans
would have none of it. They simply demurred, claiming that these issues
needed to be resolved later. That may have been because the Federalists'
balance offorces concerns eerily echoed the alarms raised by the Republicans
during the ratification debates.
What is striking about the debate in Congress on the treaty and the
implementing legislation is the degree to which the Republican majority
failed to engage the major substantive constitutional questions raised by the
Federalists. During the treaty's ratification debate in the Senate, not a single
Republican Senator took the position that the Constitution allowed for the
212
admission of new states outside the original territory of the United States.
The strategy that these Senators adopted was simply to deny that the treaty

211. See DAVID RAMSAY, AN ORATION ON THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO THE UNITED STATES
14 (1804).

212.

CURRIE,

supra note 2, at 1470.
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required statehood. Virginia Senator John Taylor observed that "the words
are literally satisfied by incorporating [Louisiana]- into the Union as a
.
d
s
,21 3 '
territory, an not as a tate.
That the Republicans would choose to avoid the issue of whether the
Louisiana Treaty itself actually
had
the
effect
of
bringing
the
new
territory
.
into the Union as states is not surprising. During the debate on the Jay
Treaty, they insisted that the House of Representatives have a role in
choosing whether and how to implement the changes in domestic and
214
commercial law required by that treaty.
In their analysis, if a .treaty
involved matters within the purview .of Congress, then both houses of
215
Congress needed to be consulted.
Similarly, in the case of the Louisiana
Treaty, Congress's power to admit new states into the Union required that
any treaty calling for the admission of new states. could not take effect
without the approval of Congress..
.
216
This proved to be a distinction without a difference. Once the treaty
became the law of the land, the admission of new states was a fait accompli.
Mter ratification, the Federalist's fears were confirmed; the treaty tied their
hands with regard to the ultimate admission of new states, and slave states in
particular. In a letter to Timothy Pickering, Rufus King asked if the
Executive could admit states by treaty or enter into an agreement binding
Congress to do so, which amounts to the same thing. Moreover, he asked,
"as Slavery is authorized. & exists in Louisiana, and the treaty engages to
protect the Property of the inhabitants, will not the present inequality, arising
217
from the Representation of Slaves, be increased?"
Pickering ·was
pessimistic. He believed that Jefferson and his fellow Republicans had not
even bothered to claim that the Constitution permitted incorporation of
.

'

'
•

'

'

213. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 51 (1803). This was at best a technical argument designed to
'
deflect serious debate, and a dubious one given Republican protestations during the Jay Treaty
controversy. See supra Part III. Still, at least one Federalist believed that the treaty was legal and
could be later sanctioned with a constitutional amendment. Senator John Quincy Adams
acknowledged that the treaty was valid even if the federal governtnent did not have the power
to admit Louisiana as a state; consent of the states could be obtained later if it was required. See
id. at 58-59. However, Adams certainly must have realized that he was mistaken when his
attempts to ratify the treaty with a constitutional amendment went nowhere. See infra notes 28385 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
215. See id.
.
216. As became clear in Missouri v. Holland, Congress has the same power ·under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to carry out the treaty provisions as the Senate and the President
have in negotiating treaties. Missouri actually concerned the constitutionality of the legislation
implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 ("If the treaty is valid
there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, section 8, as a necessary
and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.").
217. 4 KING, supra note 12, at 324 (emphasis added).
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new territory into the Union as states. But the admission of new states was
.tnevtta
. ble now t h at th e terrttory
..
h ad. b· een acquire
. d .218
Expressing similar fears, Gouverneur Morris wrote to Livingston that
Louisiana should be governed as a province with "no voice in our
219
councils." He recalled that he had never thought it wise, when the New
States Clause was drafted, for states to be formed from new territory even
Canada, which the Articles of Confederation had clearly anticipated could
become a state. He did acknowledge, however, that putting such a limitation
into the language of the New States Clause in Article IV would have
220
provoked strong opposition. Nonetheless, Morris believed that, with the
admission of so many new states, "the Constitution cannot last, and an
221
unbalanced monarchy will be established in its ruins."
The constitutionality of the treaty occupied the House of
Representatives' attention when it went into the Committee of the Whole to
consider implementing legislation. New York Representative Gaylord
Griswold observed that the Louisiana Treaty clearly called for the
incorporation of the territory into the U~nited States, something which the
Constitution simply did not give the President and the Senate the power to
do. In fact, he added, the power could not be found anywhere in the text of
the Constitution, and th.e framers clearly had not intended an addition of
222
territory large enough as possibly to "overbalance the existing territory. "
However, if the power was lodged anywhere, it was with the Congress, and
Jefferson had usurped Congress's power by making a treaty that had the
223
effect of admitting new states. It was thus incumbent on Congress to reject
the treaty because it was unconstitutional; even a beneficial measure, if it
224
violated the Constitution, should be resisted.
In their response to Griswold and the Federalists, the Republicans
shrewdly deferred consideration of the substantive objections. First, they
insisted that, since Jefferson had submitted the treaty to Congress for
implementation, those aspects of the treaty that fell within the putview of
Congress would not take effect without Congressional approval. And surely,
the highly partisan floor leader John Randolph added, the President, "as the
organ by which we communicate with [foreign states], must be the prime
225
agent, in negotiating such an acquisition~" Thus, the Republicans could
argue a position at least ostensibly consistent with the one they had taken
during the debate on the Jay Treaty.
218.
219.
220.
221.

222.
223.
224.

225.,

supra note 2, at 43.
3 SPARKS, supra note 207, at 192.
BROWN,

/d.
/d.

13 ANNALS OF CONC. 433 (1803).
!d. at 433.
/d. at 432-.
/d., at 436.
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Yet Randolph conceded even more: he reassured Federalists by insisting
that provisions of the treaty that exceeded the constitutional power of the
federal government in general would not take effect at all, absent a
226
constitutional amendment. His Republican colleague Nicholson pointed
out that the 1783 Treaty with Great Britain contained a provision requiring
the states to honor pre-war debts. Since the states had plenary power over
227
the recovery of debt, that provision never took effect. Of course, the 1783
Treaty was negotiated under the Articles of Confederation, before the states
fully delegated the treaty power to the federal government. Randolph's
reassurances did not persuade Griswold, who argued that a promise in the
228
treaty to add states amounted in principle to incorporation.
On the Senate side, many Republicans also insisted that the treaty did
not require that the new territory be admitted as states. John Taylor found
that the words of Article III of the Louisiana Treaty "are literally satisfied by
229
incorporating them into the Union as a territory, and not as a State."
Senator Smilie of Pennsylvania made the point that the constitutionality of
Article III need not be resolved, saying that, if the principles of the
Constitution forbade the admission of Louisiana into the Union, the
solution was a constitutional amendment, and until one was approved the
230 Wh
.
ld
.
"'
1
.
.
1
"
territory cou remain tn a co on1a state.
eth er t h ese arguments were
sincerely raised is doubtful: they were clearly contrary to the policy of the
231
administration favoring statehood and Jefferson's own strongly-held views.
The Republicans' insistence that the treaty would not require the
incorporation of states did have the virtue of enabling them to attack the
Federalists as inconsistent. A number of Federalists argued that the treaty
.
.
.
f
.
232 B
h
power cou 1d never encompass th e acqutsitJ.on o any territory.
ut ot ers,
such as Senator White of Delaware, said that, while the U.S. could acquire
the port of New Orleans and other areas necessary_ to control the Mississippi,
"Louisiana, this new, immense, unbounded world, if it should ever be
incorporated into this Union, which I have no idea can be done but by
altering the Constitution, I believe it will be the greatest curse that could at
233
present befall us."
Republicans, who willfully did not distinguish between
acquiring territory and incorporating it as states, made great hay out of this
difference of opinion. But what truly united Federalists was the shift in the
balance of power between regions likely to result once new states were
admitted.
226.
227~

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
13 ANNALS OF CONG. 468-69 (1803).
/d.
/d. at 50-51.
/d. at 457-58.

See supra Part N.A.
13 ANNALS OF CONG. 457-58 (1803).
/d.
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The Senate Federalists took a hard line against the treaty based on the
234
compact theory of states' rights that Plumer had expressed in his diary.
The firebrand Senator Timothy Pickering argued during the debate that
even a constitutional amendment would not make the· treaty acceptable.
Such a significant expansion of the nation could not be effected without the
unanimous consent of the existing ·states .. He believed that "the assent of
each individual State to be necessary for the admission of foreign country as
an associate in the Union; in like manner as in a commercial house, the
consent of each member would be necessary to admit a new partner into the
235
company."
The problem with this argument was that the text of the Constitution
did not support it. It was one thing to say that the treaty exceeded the
enumerated powers of the national government; it was another to impose a
special requirement . found nowhere in the Constitution that the consent
of every existing state be obtained. Instead, the logical answer was a
constitutional amendment, and that was exactly what Jefferson had already
proposed.

2. Jefferson and His Advisors
When Congress met to ratify the treaty and enact the implementing
legislation, the more important debate had already occurred elsewherewithin the Jefferson Administration. For Jefferson, the treaty presented the
same constitutional problems the Federalists had identified. He firmly
believed that ratifying the treaty was an. extra-constitutional act. In the end,
Jefferson and the Congressional Republicans both decided to avoid publicly
engaging the constitutional questions, but for different reasons. Most
Republicans thought it was not necessary; in marked contrast, Jefferson
believed that the exigencies of the moment required him to remain silent
despite profound misgivings.
While historians excuse, on practical and legal grounds, Jefferson's
failure to pursue a constitutional amendment, they overlook the balance of
forces federalism implications of the treaty that may have motivated those
doubts., A constitutional amendment was nec€ssary because the Louisiana
Treaty altered the relationship between individual states and the federal
government. The treaty lead to the admission of states with interests
opposed to those of many of the existing
... states and extended the operation
of the Three-Fifths Clause to more territory, upsetting the careful balance of
power between North and South struck by the states that ratified the
234. BROWN, supra note 2, at 69. For a discussion of Plumer's diary entry, see supra notes
204-05 and accompanying text.
235. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 44-45 (1803); see also id. at 73 (statement of Senator Thacher).
Senatcir Tracy of Connecticut added that "the relative strength which this admission gives to a
Southern and Western interest, is contradictory to the principles of our original Union." Id at
54-56.
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Constitution. The individual states' status as sovereigns required that they
assent to such a drastic change in the nature of the union. Growing
resentment in New England, and confusion and bitterness surrounding the
spread of slavery in the new territory, would result from the failure to
properly execute this constitutional change.
Even though his party now controlled two of the three branches of the
national government and the third, the judiciary, had just begun to assert
its power Jefferson was still subject to the checks and balances of his own
conscience. Jefferson clearly shared the Federalists' concerns about the
admission of foreign territory as states, and privately he expressed those
concerns in a similar fashion. He shared these doubts with most of his
closest friends and advisors, starting from the moment he received news of
236
the treaty.
But one of the administration's most influential members,
Treasury Secretary Gallatin, had already anticipated the concerns about the
incorporation of states earlier that year in response to Jefferson's query
237
about the acquisition of territory. Gallatin's long, elegant response showed
how it was easy to think that the incorporation of states from new territory
flowed naturally from the various powers of the national government:
•

The existence of the United States as a nation presupposes the
power enjoyed by every nation ·of extending their territory by
treaties, and the general power given to· the President and Senate
of making treaties designates the organ through which the
acquisition may be made~ whilst this section [Article IV, section
three] provides the proper authority (viz. Congress) for either
admitting in the Union or governing as subjects the territory thus
.
d
238
acquire .
Gallatin then reminded Jefferson that the New States Clause was
designed to replace a provision in the Articles of Confederation, which had
anticipated the admission of Canada a territory outside the current
239
boundaries of the United States.
•

236. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 23-24.
237. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 8 n.30. Albert Gallatin was, along with Madison, Jefferson's
closest advisor; together the three men formed the "triumvirate" that Henry Adams said ran the
Jefferson Administration. Adams called Gallatin a "perfect model of statesmanship." /d.
238. /d.
239. /d.; see also Letter from Wilson Cary Nicholas to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 3, 1803), in
BROWN, supra note 2, at 26-27:
I find the power as broad as it could well be made ... except that new States
cannot be fonned out of the old ones without the consent of the State to be
dismembered; and the exception is a proof to my mind that it was not intended to
confine the congress in the admission of new States to what was then the territory
of the U.S.
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This answer never satisfied Jefferson, and Gallatin himself ·later
240
acknowledged doubts. Gallatin's structural argument Jefferson answered
most elo.q uently in a famous letter to one of his closest confidants, Senator
Nicholas. The letter is worth quoting at some length. First, he entertained
the absurd results from a broad construction:
[W]hen I consider that the limits of the US are precisely fixed by
the treaty of 1783 ... I cannot help believing that .the intention was
to permit Congress to admit into the Union new States, which
should be formed out of the territory for which, & under whose
authority alone, they were then acting. I do not believe it was
meant that they might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &c. fnto
.tt, wh.IC h wou ld· b e t h e case on your construction.
. 241
.
He also described the reasons for his belief in strict construction, which
meant that, when in doubt, he would conclude that the government did not
have the power to do something:
When an instrument admits of two constructions, the one safe, the
other dangerous, the one precise, the other indefinite, I prefer that
which is safe & precise. I had rather ask an enlargement of power
from the nation; when it is found necessary, than to assume by a
construction which would make our powers boundless.
Finally, in sweeping language that called to · mind his passionate
invective against the treaty power during the Federalist administrations, he
explained the importance of Constitutional change via the amendment
process:,
Our peculiar security is in possession of a written Constitution. Let
us not make it .a blank paper by construction. I say the same as to
the opinion of those who consider the grant of the treaty making
power as boundless. If it is, then we have no Constitution . . . .
Nothing is more likely than that their enumeration of powers is
defective .... Let us go on then perfecting it; by adding, by way of
amendment to the Constitution, those powers which time & trial
show are still wanting.... I confess, then, I think it important, in
the present case, to set an example against broad construction, by
.
c
h
I
242
appeaI tng tOr new power to t e peop e.

•

240. "[N]ot even Congress can prevent some constitutional irregularity in the proceedings
relative to occupying and governing the country before an amendment to the Constitution shall
take place." 1 GALLATIN, supra note 197, at 158 (remarks on jefferson's address to Congress,
Oct 4, 1803).
241. Letter from Thomas jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 247.
242. Letter from Thomas jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8jEFFERSON
WRJTINGS, supra note 4, at 24 7-48.
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Jefferson's stirring letter to Nicholas was written after nearly two months
spent discussing the problems and considering various constitutional
amendments. He had in fact proposed an amendment as soon as the treaty
arrived from France, writing to William Dunbar that Congress would be
"obliged to ask from the People an amendment of the Constitution;
authorizing their receiving the province into the Union, and providing for
its government; and the limitations of p.o wer which shall be given by that
243
amendment, will be unalterable but by the same authority." While the
Federalists proposed an impossible solution that the treaty would require
the consent of every state Jefferson proposed to rely on the device
244
.d
d
£
.
h
c
.
.
.
provt e or In t e ·o nstttution.
Yet some historians portray Jefferson in this situation as merely an
overzealous strict constructionist. To David N. Mayer, Jefferson's concerns
245
were oddly technical.
Since states n.e ver had the pow.e r to acquire or
incorporate territory, Mayer argues, the treaty did not pose the kind of
threat to federalism that animated Jefferson's abhorrence of implied
national power and drove him to oppose, for example, the bill establishing
246
the Bank of the United States. Rather, the consequences were merely
political. Moreover, Jefferson had always espoused more flexibility in the
realm of foreign affairs when it did not concern states' rights, and later on in
his presidency, Jefferson and Congress imposed a total embargo without
247
entertaining the slightest doubts as to its constitutionality.
But there are two reasons why the Louisiana Purchase was different.
Fir~t, .it involved the use of th.e treaty power, which Jefferson had a special
antipathy toward because of the ways in which its broad scope overlapped
with the powers of Congress to legislate domestically. That is why Jefferson
railed against the treaty power during the Jay Treaty debate and published a
very narrow view of the power in the Senate Handbook of Parliamentary
248
Practice.
Second, Jefferson clearly understo,o d, if he did not write
explicitly, that the Louisiana Treaty, even more than the Jay Treaty before it,
would have a tremendous impact on states' rights.-Attorney General Lincoln
accurately predicted the passionate response of the New England
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Dunbar Quly 17, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 255.
244. The promise of a constitutional amendment would have been an important tool for
disanning the treaty's Federalist critics, and at least some segment of the public also believed
that an amendment was required to admit, as states, territory :outside the original borders of the
U.S. Before the treaty was announced, anonymous "Sylvestris" proposed an amendment to the
Constitution permitting West Florida (to be purc;hased from Spain); the New Orleans territory,
and the Mississippi Territory to enter the Union as a state. BROWN, supra note 2, at 37.
245. MAYER, supra note 2, at 216-17.
246. /d. at 215-16.
247. /d. at 216-17.
248. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing the founders' debates
concerning dangers ofthe treaty power).
243.
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Federalists, who feared the loss of influ_e nce when new states were added to
249
the South and West. In addition, maintaining the regional balance of
power was the impetus for negotiating the treaty in the first place: though
the end result was unexpected, it began as. an attempt to gain for western
and southern states the access to the Mississippi River they felt they might
lose amid treachery from northern states anxious to make treaties with Spain
25
and France favorable to them~ o.
Most historians describe the empire of liberty theory as if it represented
the accepted view of states' rights without acknowledging the dissonant
notes struck by the balance offorces theory. Mayer approvingly quotes Thomas
Paine's argument to Jefferson that the Louisiana Purchase was "within the
morality of the Constitution" because it did not alter the American system of
republican government, but merely applied it to a muc·h larger geographical
251
area. It is true that jefferson himself sympathized with this view. Writing to
a friend about the Louisiana Purchase in 1804, he said its greatest
achievement was "this duplication of area for the extending a_government so
252
free and economical as ours." Mter all, it was Jefferson himself who had
253
first referred to an "Empire of Liberty."
But the limitations of this empire of liberty theory are apparent. It is too
abstract; it ignores the fact that the Constitution was and is a document
designed to provide processes for governin_g a particular nation with its
unique geographic and cultural circumstances. Since the Constitution was
written so that it could win the approval of most legislatures in the original

249.
250.
power).
251.
252.

MALONE,

supra note 2, at 321.

See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the treaty
MAYER,

supra note 2, at 251.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestly (Jan. 29, 1804)~ in 8 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 294-95-.
253. See ONUF, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 65-70. Jefferson -first used the expression '~Empire
of Liberty" in a letter to George Rogers Clark. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George
Rogers Clark (Dec. 25,. 1780), in 2 jEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 390. Others have taken
a similar view. The historian Everett Somerville Brown, who wrote the first in"!depth analysis of
the constitutional questions raised by the Louisiana treaty; did not take a clear position on the
constitutionality of its provisions. See generally BROWN, supra note 2. Nonetheless, Brown
approvingly quoted James Madison, who, during the controversy over admitting Missouri into
the Union, wrote to a friend that the significant issue with regard to admitting new states was
simply whether they would be placed on an even footing with the existing states. Jd. at 48
(quoting Letter frotn James Madison to Robert Wa1sh (Nov. 27, 1819), in 9 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 93, at 6-7). Brown assumes, like Mayer and Thomas Paine, that there was nothing
offensive to the Constitution so long as new states were admitted on an even footing with the
old. More recently, Professor David Currie distnissed most arguments against the legality of the
treaty. See CURRIE, supra note- 2, at 103. For Currie, the seemingly broad nature of the New
States Clause demonstrates the Framers, intent that states be admitted from newly-acquired
territories. While Currie admits that the clause was written to account for the problem of
existing territories, "there seems no more reason to limit it to those territories than to- hold that
the Thirteenth Amendment protected only blacks from slavery.'' !d.
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thirteen states, its structure resulted from a series of compromises among
large and small states, South and North, with conflicting interests. For the
Federalists,- the maintenance of balance and harmony among the sections,
"the national compromise of regional and economic interests" were essential
254
republican traits. Timothy Pickering, in a speech to Congress, noted that
the Constitution expressed exactly these qualities, since it was "the result of
compromise of mutual sacrifices, of State interests, of local wishes, and
255
attachments, to the common good ."
The balance of forces theory thus
respects the hard-won, organic identity of the existing states.
A close reading of Jefferson's plans for constitutional amendments
reveals a deep concern, not only for states' rights in general, but for the
balance of forces. Jefferson had always looked westward. As early as 1780,
Jefferson had described the ''Empire of Liberty" as a continent-wide,
decentralized, republican empire, free of corruption and made up of equal,
256
autonomous states. However, the paradox at the heart of the "Empire of
Liberty," Jefferson envisioned, was that its fruition depended not only on the
expansion of the American Republic westward, but on the concomitant
preservation of local autonomy and self-government, and therefore, states'
257
rights~ This meant respecting not only the rights of future potential states,
but of the existing states as welL
Although Jefferson never explicitly admitted it, his concerns indicate
that he was aware of the problems with the "Empire of Liberty.'' The
addition of at least several new states with new interests in one part of the
nation, and in a territory equal to the size of the existing states, was bound to
change the relationship between the federal government and the existing
states. Jefferson understood this as well as any radical Federalist. As the
historian Forrest McDonald points out, Jefferson knew that full
incorporation of the entire Louisiana territory "would drastically alter the
258
constitutional nature of the Union." Thus, his proposed constitutional
amendments reveal that he at least considered it important, if not crucial,
that the process of growth should be strictly controlled so that the nature of
the Union would change gradually, and each time with the assent of the
existing states, North and South.
In drafting the amendments, Jefferson carefully considered the order
and process by which this huge new territory sh,o uld be brought into th-e
Union. He frequently spoke of closing off to settlement the area west of the
Mississippi River. He wrote to Horatio Gates that New Orleans and the
surrounding settled area would, be annexed to the Mississippi Territory while
.

,

254.
255.
256-.
257.
258.

BANNER,

supra note 16, at 20.

Jd. at 27.
0NUF, EMPIRE,

supra note 18, at 65-70.

Id. at 64-65.
McDONALD,

supra note 2, at 70.
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259

the rest would be locked up from settlement and left to the Indians~ Navy
Secretary Robert Smith, one of the advisors Jefferson consulted early on,
assured him that a constitutional amendment co.u ld prohibit Congress from
establishing a new state or territorial government north of the thirty-third
260
parallel, or granting anyone title to land in the territory.
Yet jefferson knew that the settlement of the entire Louisiana Territory
would eventually happen, so he devised a plan by w·h ich states would be
brought slowly into the union as the population achieved the proper
261
density.
Once the eastern side of the Mississippi had been settled,
presumably starting with New Orleans and working northward, settlements,
and eventually statehood, would proceed in the opposite direction on the
western side of the river, working from the headwaters of the Mississippi to
262
the delta. This plan reflected a careful balancing of north and south; and
potentially slave and non-slave, territories.
Jefferson drafted amendments designed to take away from Congress, as
much as possible, the manner in which the Louisiana Territory could be
incorporated as states. Jefferson sent the first proposed amendment to his
263
Cabinet for comment in July of 1803. As constitutional language, it seems
preposterously bulky, but it reflected Jefferson's concern that Congress have
264
as little wiggle rooffi as possible. It laid_ out in significant detail the powers

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio Gates Guly 11, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 250-51.
260. Letter from Robert Smith to Thotnas Jefferson (July 9,, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 241-42.
261. Letter from Thoma$ Jefferson to John C. Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4~ at 244.
262. Id.
263. See, ·e.g., BROWN, supra note 2, at 38; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin
(July 9, 1803) in 8jEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 96.
264. The proposed amendment is even too long to quote in its entirety, bot here is a
•
portion:
259.

The legislature of the Union shall have authority to exchange the right of
occupancy in portions where the U.S. have full right for lands possessed by Indians
within the U.S. on the East side of the Mississippi, [sic) to exchange lands on the
East side of the river for those of the white inhabitants on the West side thereof
and above the latitude of 31 degrees: to maintain in any part of the province such
military posts as may be requisite for peace or safety: to exercise police over all
persons therein, not being Indian inhabitants; to work salt springs, or mines of
coal, metals and other minerals within the possession of the U.S. or in any others
with the consent of the possessors; to regulate trade [and] intercourse between the
Indians inhabitants and all other persons; to explore and ascertain the geography
of the province, its productions and other interesting circumstances; to open roads
and navigation therein when necessary for beneficial communication; [and] to·
establish agencies and factories therein for the cultivation of commerce, peace and
good understanding with the Indians residing there.
Thomas jefferson, Draft Constitutional Amendment Quly 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON WRITINGS,
supra note 4, at 243-48.
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of Congress over the territory, which included the authority to explore the
province, establish military posts, and build mines and roads. But
significantly, it left the area west of the Mississippi above thirty-three degrees
latitude to the Indians, who would maintain "[t]he rights of occupancy in
265
the soil, and of selfgovernment.'; The proposed amendment also denied
Congress the power "to dispose of the lands of the province otherwise than
as hereinbefore permitted, until a ·n ew Amendment of the constitution shall
.
h
h
.
,,266
gtve t at aut onty. ·
This first amendment received a cool reception from Jefferson's
advisors, who pointed out to him that it was far too long and complex to be
267
workable.
In response, Jefferson drafted a shorter amendment that
provided general powers to Congress with specific limitations:
*

Louisiana, as ceded by France to the US is made part of the US. Its
white inhabitants s·h all be citizens, and stand, as to their rights &
obligations, on the same footing with other citizens of the US in
analogous situations. Save only that as to the portion thereof lying
North of an East & West line drawn through of the mouth of the
Arkansa [sic] river; no new State shall be established; nor any
grants of land made, other than to Indians in exchange for
equivalent portions of land occupied by them, until authorized by
further subsequent amendment to the Constitution shall be made
268
.
for these purposes. ·

Like the earlier amendment, this one reveals Jefferson'~ mistrust of the
power of the central government. It gives constitutional status to the
acquisition of the territory itself, thus confirming that Jefferson still believed
that the federal government did not have the power to acquire territory for
the United States, much less the power to incorporate new states into the
Union. It also reveals Jefferson's great concern about large, unincorporated
territories that the federal government potentially could wield against the
states. In assessing Jefferson;s proposed amendments, Henry Adams
remarked that Jefferson seemed unaware "[o]f any jealousy between North
and South which could be sharpened by such a restriction of northern and
269
extension of southern territory." B11:t Adams was probably unaware that
Jefferson received reports from A~torney General Lincoln about the
unhappiness of New Englanders with the treaty and had, in fact, received a

265. Id. at 241.
266. Id. at 248.
267. See Letter from Navy Secretary Robert Smtih to Thomas Jefferson in BROWN, supra
note 2, at 39; MALONE, supra note 2, at 315.
268. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 25, 1803), i.n 8 jEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 241-45.
269. 1 ADAMS, jEFFERSON HISTORY, supra note 2, at 358.
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proposal from Lincoln concerning ways that North-South tensions regarding
270
the incorporation of new states could be reduced.
In proposing and arguing for the constitutional amendments, Jefferson
explained that he thought it appropriate to seek the approval of "the
people" or "the nation" before -opening each new stretch of land for
271
settlement and eventual statehood.
Henry Adams made much of this
language, arguing that Jefferson essentially abandoned his federalism
principles in favor of centralized .national government. The Constitution;
Adams wrote,
. .

in dealing with the matter of amendments, made no reference to··
the nation; the word itself was unknown to the Constitution, which
invariably spoke of the Union wherever such an expression was
needed; and on the Virginia theory Congress had no right to
appeal to the nation at all, except as a nation of States, for an
272
amendment.
'

Adams's point is well taken, but the fact
that
Jefferson
believed
that
a
•
•
constitutional amendment was necessary showed that Adams misconstrued
Jefferson's meaning. For one thing, the Founders often spoke of "the
people" when referring to constitutional amendments because they believed
273
tJ:lat a constitutional amendment was a decisive act of the people. And
'
Jefferson believed that federalism was the best means of preserving
274
republicanism, that securing states' rights secured individual rights. In
seeking a constitutional amendment, Jefferson would have put faith in a
process that required the legislatures of three-fourths of the existing states to
approve the incorporation of new territory that had the potential to become
new states of the Union.
At the same time, enormous pressures conspired to make upholding
•

•

270. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text Attorney General Lincoln: who had
been Jefferson's eyes and ears in New England, wrote to the President on September 10, 1803,
to report that, as he had predicted, the Federalists were "vexed, disappointed, mortified,
enraged .... " While he suggested that Jefferson could argue for the constitutionality of the
treaty, he admitted that a constitutional amendment was the safest option. Letter from Levi
Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson from Worcester, Mass. (Sept
IO; 1803), in MALONE, supra note 2,
.·
at 321 n.24.
'271. 1 ADAMS, jEFFERSON HISTORY;supra note 2, at 359-60.
272. !d. (emphasis in original).
273. George Washington. spoke :of constitutional amendments this. way. In his farewell
address, Washington said, "If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of
the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in
the way which the Constitution designates." George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17,
1796), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 205·, 212 Qames D.
Richardson ed., 1897).
274. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.C.V.C Destutt de Tracy· Qan. 26, 1811), in 9
]EFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 309; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gjdeon Granger
(Aug. 13, 1800), in 7 JEFFERSON WRITINGS~ supra note 4, at 451-52.
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Jefferson'-s principles difficult. Jefferson felt that, unless Congress acted
quickly, the opportt1nity to purchase Louisiana would be lost. The treaty of
275
cession had arrived on-July 14, 1803, and had to be ratified by October 30.
Livingston wrote Jefferson from France warning him that Napoleon could
276
change his mind about the deal. Jefferson also knew that expressing his
doubts about the treaty's constitutionality would give his Federalist
277
opponents a trump card. Thus the strategy emerged to get Congress to
approve the treaty first, and then use the treaty's doubtful constitutionality
to build support for a constitutional amendment. Senator Nicholas
expressed the view, widely held among Republicans, that if Jefferson
declared he believed the treaty unco.nstitution~l, the Senate would probably
reject it. Nicholas suggested that Jefferson "avoid giving an opinion as to the
competence of the treaty-making power" beca~se "if the Senate act before
278
your opinion is known they will at least d~vide responsibility with you." So
neither Jefferson nor any of hi~ allies mentioned the constitutional questions
when h.€ called Congress in special session to consider the treaty in October
279
of 1803. In fact,Jefferson urged his friends to avoid mentioning potential
'
constitutional difficulties, noting ''that w~at is- necessary for surmounting
280
them must be done sub-silentio."
In another oft-quoted letter to Breckinridge, Jefferson struggled to
reconcile the need to act quickly with his strict construction principle,
eventually deciding that expediency would require an extra-constituti.onal
act be subsequently made constitutional by amendment:
.

.

.

.

'

'

.

The Executive in seizing th_e fugitive occurrence which so much
advances the good of their country, have done an act beyond the
Constitution. The Legislature. in casting behind them metaphysical
subtleties, and risking themselves like faithful servants, must ratify
& pay for it, and throw themselves on their country for doing for
them unauthorized what we know they would have done for
themselves had they been in a situation to do it. It is the case of a
guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an
'

275. MALONE, supra note 2, at 302.
276. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1158 (1803). While there is no reason to doubt that Jefferson
honestly feared losing such a bargain, the truth is that Napoleon had already made up his mind
and was unlikely to change it. In fact, Napoleon was in such a weak bargaining position that he
probably issued the threat to prod jefferson into accepting the deal instead of simply taking the
territory by force. See MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 71. As for Livingston, his own personal
interest in the success of the treaty probably motivated him to put pressure on Jefferson to act
quickly. One historian called his letter to Jefferson self-serving "nonsense., See 4 BRANT, supra
note 2, at 143.
277. Malone, supra note 2, at 316.
278. BROWN, supra note 2, at 27.
279. MALONE, supra note 2, at316.
280. Letter from Thomas jefferson to Breckinridge and Thomas Paine (Aug. 18, 1803), in 8
jEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 245. .
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important adjacent territory; & saying to him when of age, I did
this for your own good; I pretend to no right to bind you: you may
disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as I can: I thought it
my duty to risk myself for you. But we shall not be disavowed by the
nation, and their act of indemnity [ (constitutional amendment)]
will confirm &_ not weaken the Constitution, by more strongly
28t
.
. .
marktng out Its 11nes.

This argument, that constitutionality could be conveyed ex post facto, is
suspect, and marks the beginning of Jefferson's retreat from principle. It
does reveal the way in which Jefferson believed he could reconcile a strict
rule with the need for executive flexibility. Most importantly, Jefferson
believed that the worst result could be avoided that the Louisiana Purchase
would set a precedent for expanding the power of the national government.
But this reasoning turned out to be a trap. Nicholas reminded Jefferson
of the practical consequences that proposing a post-hoc con·s titutional
amendment would lead Federalists to argue that jefferson had exceeded his
authority in urging ratification. Even after the Senate passed the treaty and
the Congress had passed implementing legislation, an amendment passed to
justify these acts would have diminished the administration's credibility.
Breckinridge voiced this concern to jefferson: "Ifwe attempt amendments &
282
c.
I
d tn
. a worse sttuauon
.
· t h an we, are now In.
· "
rat"I , we sh a II b e pace
The Federalist John Quincy Adams, who also believed that a
constitutional amend-m ent was necessary to approve the treaty, was the only
283
person in Congress who actually proposed one.
Mter the treaty was
approved, Adams told Madison he would introduce a constitutional
amendment if no one else did. Madison put him off~ replying that "he did
284
not know that it was universally agreed that it required an amendment."
When Adams went ahead and proposed a committee to draft an amendment
that would allow for the incorporation of acquired territory into the Union,
285
it garnered only three votes.
While a few Republicans argued that an
amendment was not necessary, most simply did not engage the question,
286
and Breckinridge dismissed the proposal as impractical.
Most of the
momentum for an amendment dissipated once the Senate ratifie~ the
Louisiana Treaty and the Congress passed the implementing legislation.
As for Jefferson, his fieryt principled letter to Wilson Cary Nicholas had
ended with a sunny whimper: "If, 'however, our friends shall think

281. MALONE, supra note 2~ at 313-14.
282. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 76-77.
283. BROWN, supra note 2, at 30-31.
284. 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 267-268 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1877)
[hereinafter ADAMS MEMOIRS].
285. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 78.
286. MALONE, supra note 2, at 331.

'.

STATES' RIGHTS AND THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE

397

differently, certainly I acquiesce with satisfaction; confiding, that the good
sense of our country will correct the evil of construction when it shall
287
produce ·ill effects."
Although he still sought advice on the treaty's
constitutionality after writing the letter to Nicholas, he never did submit an
288
amendment. Scholars do not agree upon why Jefferson failed to follow
through with his plans given his grave doubts and firmly expressed
principles. For example, since Thomas Paine was one of the last to
correspond with Jefferson on the ~onstitutionality of the treaty, the historian
Forrest McDonald concludes that Paine persuaded Jefferson to change his
.
d
289
mtn .
However, it seems far more likely, given the seriousness with which he
treated the issue in private correspondence and his continuing advocacy of
states' rights and strict construction after the treaty was approved, that
Jefferson's own doubts about the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase
290
were never assuaged. He never abandoned or compromised his belief that
federalism was the primary canon of constitutional interpretation. Periodic
amendment was Jefferson's favored approach to constitutional change, as it
reinforced the republican principles that Jefferson and his allies had rallied
291
to during the lean Federalist years. Jefferson knew not only that the treaty
was an act beyond the Constitution, but that : it was a betrayal of his
principles concerning the mode .of constitutional interpretation he
292
forcefully advocated until the end of his life.
Most revealing are Jefferson'~ later attempts, after his presidency, to
justify his actions that seemed inconsistent with his own principles as
grounded in the doctrine of necessity. In 1810,Jefferson, while not referring
specifically to the Louisiana Treaty, could easily have been thinking of it
287. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 248.
288. Jefferson received letters from Attorney General Lincoln supporting an amendment
and from Thomas Paine arguing that one was not necessary.
289. MCDONALD, supra note 11, at 59. Biographer Dumas Malone concludes thatJefferson
was "caught in a chain of inexorable circumstances" and driven "by the pitiless logic of events"
to refrain from publicly proposing a constitutional amendment. MALONE, supra note 2, at 319,
332. Joseph Ellis believes that the West triggered Jefferson's most "visionary energies" which
"overrode his traditional republican injunctions." ELLIS, supra note 77, at 252.
290. MAYER, supra note 2, at 251. In particular, Paine's argument that the acquisition of
Louisiana had been foreseeable by the Framers "probably did not move Jefferson," who viewed
questions of original intent very strictly. Id.
291. See id. at 296:
The generally strict theory of interpretation that Jefferson applied to the federal
constitution had as its corollary an emphasis upon explicit change through
amendment, rather than accommodation through interpretation, as the vehicle
for adding to federal powers, as his proposals with respect to the Louisiana
Purchase and internal improvements, for example, indicate.
292. Jefferson protested attempts to authorize internal improvements projects within the
states as "usurpations" of states' powers. Id. at 220.
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p~blic

officers must

when he addressed the question of whether high
assume authority beyond the law:

A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high
duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of
n,ecessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country . . . by a
scrupulous adherence to the written law, would be to lose the law
itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying
293
them with us; thus absurdly s4crificing the end to the means.

•

If we take this later writing as evidence of jefferson's views at the time of
the Louisiana Treaty, Jefferson seemed to agree to disagree with his friends
on the legality of the treaty while at the same time acknowledging the
necessity of following their advice and trusting in the soundness of public
opinion, rather than his own principles, for the good of the nation and his
presidency. As he wrote in his letter to Nicholas during the treaty debates,
"[w]hat is practicable must often control what is pure theory; and the habits
294
of the governed determine in a great degree what is practicable." Thus
Jefferson's exception to the principle of strict construction was justified by
the same purpose as the principle that the voice of the people needed to
be heard.
The irony is that Jefferson probably need not have resorted to this
constitutional escape clause at alL Although he doubtless felt a great deal of
pressure to move quickly, Jefferson probably had the freedom to protect
both the constitutional principles he prized and the national interest. There
is little evidence to suggest that a constitutional amendment would not have
been speedily approved given the widespread popularity of the purchase and
the Republican dominance in most states. Even the Federalistjohn Quincy
Adams believed that all of the state legislatures would approve an
amendment and that, at the very least, "there could be no possible doubt it
would be ratified by a number sufficient to make it part of the
295
Constitution."
Of course, one can also believe that the treaty was
technically legal and still assert that a constitutional amendment would have
been the best way to guarantee widespread acceptance of that legality. As a
practical matter, Jefferson and his friends' concerns about the risks of
openly proposing a post-hoc constitutional amendment, if not unfounded,
were overstated. Indeed, Professor David Currie, who believes the treaty was
constitutional, points out that the approval of an amendment would have
removed the question of legitimacy from the table, and would have removed
·.

.

..

.

293. MALONE, supra note 2, at 320.
294. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in MAYER, supra
note 2, at 3.20.
295. DOCUMENTS RElATING TO NEW ENGlAND FEDERALISM 158 (Henry Adams ed.;
1905) [hereinafter ADAMS, NEW ENGLAND]; see also BROWN, supra note 2, at 29 ("Doubtless such
an amendment as Jefferson desired could have been carried without great difficulty .... ").
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doubt as to whether states could be admitted when the time came. ln sum,
Jefferson would have at once eliminated critics' arguments that he was
usurping power while satisfying his .own concerns about the treaty power
.
297
being too broad.
Instead, by abandoning his principles out of purported necessity,
Jefferson left ·h imself vulnerable to legitimate criticism. And many of the
early assessments of his performance during the Louisiana Purchase were
withering. One of the harshest critics was John Quincy Adams who, later in
his life, perhaps still bitter about his failure to muster much support for a
constitutional amendment, denounced the Louisiana Treaty:
It mad~ a Union totally different from that for which the
Constitution had been formed. It give~ despotic power over
territories purchased. It naturalizes foreign nations in a mass. It
makes French and . Spanish laws a large part of the laws of the
Union. It introduced whole systems of legislation abhorrent to the
spirit and character of our instituti<?ns,
and
all
this
done
by
an
.
administration which came in blowing a trumpet against implied
.
298
.
power.

The purchase of Louisiana was, Adams concluded, "an assumption of
implied power greater in itself and more comprehensive in its consequences
than all the assumptions of implied powers in the years of the Washington
299
and Adams Administrations put together."
Henry Adams carried on this family legacy in his History of the United
States with an almost tragic portrayal of Jefferson as a man surrendering his
ideal of strict construction for short-term political benefit. "The Pope could
as safely trifle with the doctrine of apostolic succession as Jefferson with· the
300
limits of Executive power," Adams wrote. Yet "the Louisiana treaty gave a
fatal wound to 'strict construction,' and the Jeffersonian theories never
301
again r~ceived gener~l support." .To Adams, Jefferson had done what he
302
himself warned against: made blank paper of the Constitution.
Later in the Nineteenth Century, Judge Thomas Cooley assessed
Jefferson's actions negatively, arguing that the damage had been lasting
even though the issues it raised had been essentially settled by default. "The
practical settlement of the question of Constitutional power," he said in a
speech,
·
did not heal the wound the Constitution received when the chief
296~

CURRIE,

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
:302.

See id.
5 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 284, at 401.
/d. at 364-65.
ADAMS; supra note 153, at 362.
/d. at 363.
/d. at 364.

supra note 2, at 107.
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officer holding office under it advised the temporary putting it
aside, and secured the approval of his advice by a numerical
majority of the people. The poison was in the doctrine which took
from the Constitution all sacredness, and made subject to the will
and caprice of the hour that which, in the intent of the founders,
. was above parties, and majorities, and presidents. After that time
the proposal to exercise unwarranted powers on a plea of necessity
might be safely advanced without exciting the detestation it
303
deserved ....
Henry Cabot Lodge summed it up most succinctly when he wrote that the
purchase "was the first lesson which taught Americans that a numerical
304
majority was superior to the Constitution."
More recent assessments have been far more generous. As if to confirm
Judge Cooley's fears, most contemporary historians seem content to rely
simply on the judgment that the vast benefits accruing to the nation from
the Louisiana Purchase were more than worth the costs to constitutional
.
.
1
305
prtnctp es.
But in the end, the greatest harm with regard to the Louisiana Purchase
was not in the changes it made to the geographical character of the Union;
although these changes were certainly important, they were probably
inevitable. Rather, the lasting damage would come from the wrong choice of
means for constitutional change. Jefferson biographer Joseph Ellis calls the
decision to avoid an amendment "unqu,e stionably correct'' because the
resulting debate "would have raised a constellation of nettlesome
questions about slavery and the slave trade, Indian lands, Spanish land
claims and a host of other jurisdictional issues that might have put the
306
entire purchase at risk." But the amendment process was the means by
which Jefferson believed the most difficult questions facing the nation
should be worked out. As David Mayer noted, Jefferson believed strongly in
the "principle that constitutional problems ought to be resolved not through
ingenious construction wheth,e r as an exercise of executive prerogative, as
'

•

303. LODGE, supra note 164, ~t 333-34.
304. Jd. at 434-35. Similarly, the eminent historian Frederick Jackson Turner later
concluded that the Louisiana Purchase ''resulted in strengthening the loose interpretation of
the Constitution.'• Frederick J. Turner, The Significance of the Louisiana Purchase, 27 AM.
MONTHLY REV. OF REVS. 578, 583 (1903).
305. See e.g., ELLIS, supra note 77, at 211. Some contemporary historians, in judging
Jefferson's actions with regard to the Louisiana Purchase, have concluded that he could not
have done otherwise. Jefferson biographer Dumas Malone ack11owledged that the Louisiana
treaty changed the character of the Union. MALONE, supra note 2, at 326. Nonetheless, he
believed Jefferson was "caught in a chain of inexorable circumstances," id. at 332, and driven
"by the pitiless logic of events," i,d. at 319, to refrain from publicly proposing a constitutional
amendment. To Malone, Jefferson's suppression of his principles demonstrated his skills as a
leader that he "was a good party man, that he did take counsel." ld. at 319.
306. ELLIS, supra note 77, at 211.
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in the Louisiana Purchase, or as an exercise of judicial interpretation ... 307
but rather through appeals to the people.-" As I discuss in the next Part, an
appeal to "the people" through a constitutional amendment was especially
important given the eventual consequences of the treaty those that had
been ·anticipated by the Federalists the disruption of the balance of power
between regions and the addition of numerous slave states in the South and
West.
V.

THE LEGACY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE

In this Part, I consider the consequences of the failure to ratify the
Louisiana Treaty with a constitutional amendment. Inevitably, this involves a
308
great deal of speculation.
However, what is striking about subsequent
developments is the degree to which the debate between the Jeffersonians'
empire of liberty federalism and the Federalists' balance of forces federalism
never really ended. As I discuss in the first subpart, this conflict merely faded
into the background while Congress addressed the regulation of slavery in
the Louisiana Territory. When the two theories of federalism re-emerged,
they became inextricably intertwined with the issue of slavery: balance offorces
with the regulation of slavery by the national government; the empire of liberty
with the right of states to permit slavery. This demonstrates that the most
important issues raised by the Louisiana Treaty itself were not satisfactorily
resolved until the Civil War~ I argue that a constitutional amendment could
well have resolved this conflict, and possibly also resolved the question of
whether Congress could regulate slavery in the territory the burning issue
in the decades leading up to secession~ Yet because the empire of liberty
federalism finally triumphed in the Dredd Scott decision resulting in the
triumph of slavery in the West federalism itself was suspect.
In the second subpart, I discuss a related consequence of the failure to
seek an amendment: it paved the way for further re-interpretations of the
Constitution outside the Article Five amendment process. The Louisiana
Purchase set a precedent for expansion of federal power, and the
corresponding reduction of states, rights, through federal actions that failed
to give the states a voice in constitutional change.
A.

THE REGULATION OF SLA VE"'RY IN THE TERRITORIES

Once the treaty was ratified and implemented, Congress was left to
decide how to go about preparing the citizens of the territory for statehood.
In some respects, the Louisiana Territory was treated differently than other
existing territories,. in part because its inhabitants were largely non-English.
309
Even so, the southern portion proceeded to join the Union by 1812. But

307.
308.
309.

MAYER, supra note 2, at 313.

I proceed fully aware of the danger of engaging in counter-factual hypotheticals.
Onuf, Expanding Union, supra note 18, at 64.
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the crucial question was whether slavery would be permitted in this vast new
area of the United States. The Republicans' success at incorporating the
Louisiana Territory brought slavery to the forefront of the issues causing
tension among the states. The Federalists would eventually associate
slavery rightly, perhaps with their loss of .influence in the national
government. Jefferson's failure to request a constitutional amendment was a
lost opportunity to seek approval from all of the states for changes that
would one day drive them to separation.
The Northwest Ordinance promised statehood to each territorial unit
310
upon reaching a population of sixty thousand.
The same promise was
extended to the Mississippi Territory encompassing what is now Mississippi
311
and Alabama with one important difference slavery was permitted. In
contrast to these earlier compacts with territories, the Louisiana treaty
merely promised incorporation and the admission of the inhabitants "to the
rights" of U.S. citizens. Jefferson's original plan for Louisiana, as his very
detailed first proposed amendment indicates, involved the annexation of
New Orleans, and the settled territory surrounding it, to the existing
3 12
Mississippi Territory and ''locking up" the rest from white settlement.
Thus this small area of the Louisiana Territory would have proceeded to
statehood in a manner similar to the states governed by the Northwest
Ordinance.
However, once the treaty and implementing legislation were approved,
Jefferson changed his mind. He wrote in a letter to Gallatin that, " [w] ithout
looking at the old territorial ordinance [Northwest Ordinance] I had
imagined it best to found a government for the territory or territories of
lower Louisiana on that basis. But on examining it, I find it will not do at all;
that it would turn all their laws topsy-turvy." Instead, Jefferson decided the
best arrangement was for him to appoint a governor and three judges with
full legislative powers who would introduce the rights of American
citizenship trial by jury in criminal cases, habeas corpus, freedom of the
press "by degrees as they find practicable without exciting too much
313
discontent." Historian Everett Brown pointed out the irony of this plan:
'jefferson, who had drawn up the Declaration of Independence, is here
found planning a form of government in which the people to be governed
314
were to have no voice whatever. " Despite these limitations, Louisiana

310.
text.
311.
312.

/d. at 70. For analysis of the Ordinance, see supra notes 141-49 and accompanying
/d. at 64.

Letter from Thomas jefferson to Horatio Gates Uuly 11, 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 249-50; supra notes 256--74 and accompanying text (discussing
Jefferson's proposed constitutional amendments).
313. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Nov. 9, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 275.
314. BROWN, supra note 2, at 97.
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proceeded quickly along the path to statehood, joining the Union in 1812,
315
earlier than Mississippi (1817) or Alabama (1818) .
The most significant question remaining to be resolved was that of
slavery. The Northwest Ordinance, unlike the Mississippi Territory's
compact, contained an absolute prohibition on slavery. Even delegates from
states with large slave populations voted for the provision in 1786 because
they knew that western states would share their interests anyway, and their
316
real concern was with preserving economic ties to the West.
Nor had
slavery been the most important worry for the Federalists. As late as 1815,
Federalist leaders, such as Timothy Pickering, were more concerned that the
West would seek to dominate by forming a temporary alliance with the
South, then overthrowing the entire eastern seaboard. Thus some New
Englanders on occasion still contemplated an alliance between North and
317
South against West.
Inevitably, however, the Three-Fifths Clause tied the dominance of the
southern and western states in the Congress, and thus the dominance of
Republicans, to the existence of slavery. Many sons of Federalist fathers
assumed leading roles in the rise of abolitionism in New England after 1815,
and they considered the fight against slavery and the South as the true
heritage of Federalism. By the 1830s, abolitionist historians saw the 1800
election, and the Louisiana Purchase, as victories "of forces scheming to
318
extend slave territory and Southern power.''
Still, when Congress debated and approved the government bill for
Louisiana in 1804, the country was not yet geographically stratified on th-e
319
issue of slavery.
At least some Senators and Representatives- did not yet
feel that slavery, or the opposition to it, was inextricably bound up with their
states' interests. Not all southern Senators supported allowing slavery in
Louisiana; some felt that it would be too difficult to prevent a slave
insurrection in the wilderness province, and Senators Franklin of North
Carolina and Breckinridge of Kentucky declared themselves opposed to
32
permitting any slavery to exist. Conversely, Senator Dayton of New Jersey
supported allowing slavery, believing that the province would never be
settled without it, and that the treaty had committed the United States to
321
respecting the right of Louisiana's inhabitants to own slaves.
However, the issue dominated discussion of the government bill, and a
fault line began to develop that would one day become an unbridgeable
chasm. After efforts by Federalists to prohibit slavery in Louisiana failed, a

°

315.
316.
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Onuf, Expanding Union, supra note 18, at 64.
ONUF, supra note 133, at 111.
BANNER, supra note 16, at 111-12.

Id. at 109.
BROWN, supra note 2, at 108.
/d. at 108,119-20.
!d. at 113-14.

404

88 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[2003]

bill was introduced allowing only U.S. citizens residing in a state who were
bona fide owners of slaves to bring them into the Louisiana Territory for the
purposes of settlement. The importation of slaves from abroad was
prohibited, and any slave imported since May 1, 1798, was excluded from
322
·the territory. The debate in the Senate was confused and bitter, but the
bill passed. "I think it unfortunate,'' said Senator White of Delaware, "that
whenever this question is stirred, feelings are excited that [are] calculated to
,323
1ead us astray.
The result demonstrated the growing power of slavery as a vital interest
for southern states and their increasing dominance in national politics. In
the end, it was only the divisions among Republicans that allowed the
324 Th
h.
d
. .
b ecame muc h
.
.
.
1
h
IImitations on s avery t at were ac teve .
. us L outstana
more like the Mississippi Territory in terms of slavery than the territory
governed by the Northwest Ordinance. The existence of slavery in
Louisiana, once established, would be difficult to eliminate, and the
geographical area in which it could now potentially spread was vast.
The success of the Louisiana Purchase, and the inability of its
opponents to limit the inevitable introduction of new Republican states,
embittered the New England Federalists. Inclined toward paranoia, they saw
the declining influence of their region and party as the workings of a
325
malevolent political force.
They felt that the Louisiana Purchase
represented the defeat of the view of the Constitution as a compact among
states and a victory for the power of the national government. "Instead of
free republicks united by solemn compact, under a federal government with
limited powers," expressed the Massachusetts Federalists, "we have become a
consolidated empire under the absolute controul of a few men we have
326
sunk into the deep abyss of a frightful despotism."
An anonymous
pamphleteer in 1804 proclaimed that "[w]e are parties in name to a
confederacy over which we have no influence, nor control, nor effective
voice in the national councils, and the wishes and the policy of New England
are only known as they furnish themes for the invective and irony of those
,327
.
w h o rue
1 t h. e nation.
Increasingly, the Federalists came to believe that slavery, rather than the
328
Constitution, was to blarne. Convinced that the dominance ofVirginia and
the South, and the Louisiana Purchase itself, had been the result of the
operation of the Three-Fifths Clause, the Federalists after 1804 began

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1297 (1803).
PLUMER, supra note 158, at 115.
MCDONALD, supra note 11, at 61.
BANNER, supra note 16, at 40.
ld. at 40-41.
A DEFENCE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF MAsSACHUSETTS, OR THE RIGHTS OF NEWENQLAND
VINDICATED 4 (Boston, 1804), quoted in BANNER, supra note 16, at86.
328. BANNER, supra note 16, at 103.
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actively to seek its repeal. ''[T]he slave representation,'' said Josiah Quincy,
329
"is the cause of all the difficulties we labor under."
So great was the disillusionment that talk of secession began to be taken
seriously. William Plumer said that the eastern states would be forced "to
330
ln January of 1804, as
establish a separate and independent empire."
Congress was to debate the Louisiana government bill, Timothy Pickering
331
convened a group in Washington to come up with a plan of secession.
Their plot to elect Aaron Burr as a secessionist governor of New York was
thwarted by other Federalists, and other subsequent schemes were equally
332
stillborn. However, after a series of foreign policy blunders led to the War
of 1812, the secessionist movement gained new life, and the Massachusetts
legislature called for other New England states to convene in Hartford,
.
£
.
th
d
.
333
Connecttcut, or a convention _ at most e-x pecte to propose secesston.
Moderates prevailed at the Convention, however, and it merely proposed
seven constitutional amendments designed to ad.d ress New Englanders'
concerns. The first proposed amendment sought to eliminate the Three334
Fifths Clause. Another would have required a two-thirds majority vote in
335
.e ach house of Congress before a state could be admitted to the Union.
The arguments raised by the Federalists during the Louisiana Treaty
debate, and the balance of forces view of the Constitution they implied, kept
returning even after most believed they had been discredited. When
Louisiana, which comprised the southern, and most settled, tip of the huge
territory, applied for statehood in 1811, the Federalists had not given up,
and they repeated their warnings about the dangers to the balance of the
Union. "Instead of these new States being annexed to us," Representative
Laban "Wheaton of Massachusetts warned; ''we shall be annexed to them,
336
lose our in-d ependence, and become altogether subject to their control. "
Josiah Quincy delivered a long, impassioned speech in which he insisted that
"[t]he ·proportion of the political weight of each sovereign State depends
upon the number of States which have a voice under th.e compact." If
Congress should "throw the weight ofLouisiana onto the scale," the balance
337
that the original states sought to sustain would be "destroyed."
The
solution, proposed repeatedly by the Federalists, and always defeated, was a
.
.
I
d
33s
constttuttona amen ment.
.·

329 ..

/d ..at 102.
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Historian Peter Onuf argues that the Federalists' balance offorces vision
of the Constitution was already obsolete when Quincy expressed it in the
House debate. It relied, Onuf believes, on an outmoded European concept
339
that simply did not apply to a peacefully-expanding union. At the same
time, however, Onuf seems to be aware that a great deal had been lost in
abandoning the balance offorces view. The Republicans' empire of liberty theory
held that the Union could expand indefinitely so long as each new state was
340
admitted on an equal footing with the old. Yet, Onuf points out, "Quincy's
speech would prove prophetic, for union depended on sustaining an
intersectional balance and accommodating the fundamentally conflicting
interests that his use of the language of state sovereignty so obviously
341
assumed/' Keeping the union together would depend on awareness of the
Federalists' balance of forces vision of the Constitution, which the Louisiana
treaty implicitly rejected.
Onuf was not quite right when he declared the balance of forces dead.
Like Banquo's Ghost, it kept returning to the dinner table to frighten the
342
.
.
.
.
empire of liberty.~ Its most devastating appearance was on February 13, 1819,
when the U.S. House of Representatives "resolved itself into a Committee of
the Whole to consider statehood enabling bills for the territories of Missouri
343
and A1abama." Not only did the sectional balance of power hinge on the
status of Missouri, but these two territories would set a precedent for the rest
344
of the states admitted from the Louisiana Territory. In a provocative move
that summoned the balance of forces from its grave, James Tallmadge
introduced an amendment to ban the admission of slaves into Missouri or
~5
.
any other part o f t he terrttory.
During this debate, the Federalists advanced the same arguments from
a balance of forces theory of states' rights that they had used during the
Louisiana Treaty debate. The original compron1ises in the Constitution
regarding slavery, the Federalists argued, were the result of a balance struck
among the thirteen original states. Rufus King, who had also been present
during debates on the Louisiana Treaty, said that "the considerations arising
out of their actual condition, their past connexion, and the obligation which
all felt to promote a reformation in the federal government, ·w ere particular
346
to the time and parties.'' To extend those balances beyond the original
limits of the United States would not be faithful to the original compact. As
a practical matter; the incorporation of new slave states in the West would
'

.

339.
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343.
344.
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346.
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ld.
ld.
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result in a huge increase of the area in which the Three-Fifths Compromise
operated. Thus the northern states, losing relative representation in
Congress, would be helpless to enforce the terms of the original bargain. So,
they concluded, the federal government had the power to regulate slavery in
347
order to preserve the interests of the original states.
The Southern Republicans responded with Jefferson's empire of liberty
federalism. No state could be forced to enter the Union according to
conditions. All states were born equal. Missouri, they argued, had the right
to enter the Union on an equal footing, without restrictions. This time,
however, the balance offorces argument enjoyed a temporary revival. Congress
enacted the Missouri Compromise, in which Missouri was admitted as a slave
state, Maine as a free state, and which led to the drawing of the 36°30' North
latitude line, north of which slavery would be excluded and south of which it
348
would be authorized. This action pushed the debate into the background
temporarily. Yet the empire of liberty again emerged with Stephen Douglas's
idea of popular sovereignty, implemented by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of
1854, which abandoned the geographical line in favor of elections to
349
determine a new states' slave or free status. The empire of liberty view of the
Constitution was ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court in the infamous
Dred Scott decision, in which the Missouri Compromise was struck down as
.
.
I
35o
unconstttuttona .
Jefferson, sick at home in Monticello, called the Missouri Crisis a "fire
bell in the night" that woke him from his satisfied retirement because it
351
threatened to undo the work of his entire political career. He condemned
the restrictionist efforts, unable to accept that an artificial line would divide
352
the "Empire of Liberty" he had sought to build. As Peter Onuf concluded,
Jefferson's ambitions were the victim of the empire of liberty theory that he had
353
long advocated. Jefferson wanted the United States to become a large
nation of many equal states, each exercising broad powers in its own
domain, yet with its interests in harmony with the others. So long as state
equality was recognized, Jefferson hoped that "relations of blood and
354
affection" would overcome considerations of geography. Yet Jefferson had
a blind spot for slavery; he simply refused to address it, declaring it a matter

347.
348.
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350.
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355

for the next generation to resolve.
He could not accept the fact that
slavery had become a powerful sectional interest that transcended state
boundaries while dividing the nation in two. Such were the consequences of
his having earlier ignored the balance ojforces view.
These debates over slavery, the Constitution, and· , the nature of the
union, would have occurred even if jefferson had followed through with his
plan to ratify the Louisiana Treaty with a constitutional amendment. Yet
Jefferson's original instincts were correct: only by returning to the People
for permission to expand, and perhaps resolving the issue of slavery in the
territories while it was not yet the issue that would reflexively fracture the
nation along sectional lines, could the nation have hoped to avoid the
356
battles that paralyzed Congress in the years leading up to the Civil War.
B.

THE DECUNE OF THE ARTICLE FivE METHOD OF CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION

This subpart examines the long-term consequences of the Louisiana
Purchase on the method by which the Constitution could be altered~ Under
a balance of forces view of federalism, the Article Five constitutional
amendment process is crucial, because it secures a role for the existing states
whenever there is a proposed alteration in the fundamental relationship
between the states and the national government. But by ratifying the
Louisiana Treaty without seeking an amendment, Jefferson and the
Congress reinterpreted the Constitution. The act of approving and
implemen~ing the treaty effectively established that it was constitutional for
the federal government to incorporate new states into the Union through
the treaty power. The failure of Jefferson and Congress to affirm the
constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase with an amendment seriously
diminished the role that Article Five, and the states themselves, would play
in future constitutional change.
Article Five is the only text-based method for amending the
Constitution. An amendment approved by two-thirds of both houses of
Congress must be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states to
357
take effect. Alternatively, if two-thirds of the state legislatures petition
Congress, it must call a constitutional convention for prop,o sing
amendments, which take effect when approved either by three-fourths of the
state legislatures or, if Congress directs, by conventions in three-fourths of
. 358
th-e st a t es.
.

355.
356.

.

jOSEPH]. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 239-40 (First Vintage 2000).
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E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
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Congress finally considered constitutional amendments that might resolve the crisis "because
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A wave of recent scholarship; led by Professor Bruce Ackerman,
co-n cludes that most fundamental constitutional change has taken place
359
outside Article Five.
According to Professor Ackerman, American
democracy operates on two levels, with long periods of ordinary lawmaking
interrupted by "higher lawmaking," or "constitutional moments," in which
one or more of the political branches create a new constitutional regime
360
with the overwhelming support of the People~ There have been three such
transitions in American history, initiated by the writing of the Constitution,
361
the Civil War, and the New Deal. · Each of these constitutional moments
proceeded through a discrete series of stages. First, in a "signaling stage,';
the reformers moved to the center stage of public attention. Next, during a
"proposal stage," a series of reforms was articulated. Then followed a
362
"mobilized popular deliberation" and finally, legal codification. Ackerman
believes it is particularly significant that each of these major changes
363
occurred without the normal Article Five procedure.
Other scholars have built on Ackerman's thesis and expanded the
definition of constitutional change to include le'ss obviously dramatic shifts
in the law. Professor James Pope focused on "republican moments," or
"periodic outbursts of democratic participation and ideological politics," in
which social movements overcome interest group politics in order to

359.

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
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see jOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE

UNITED STATES 76-80 (1994) (describing various methods of constitutional change, including
court decisions and acts of political branches); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the _
Un_ited
States: From Theary. to Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 37, 39 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995) (defining the Constitution as "text~based institutional practice,). But seeKYVIG, supra note
356, at xi (arguing that constitutional amendments are qualitatively unique constitutional acts).
Akhil Reed Amar believes that Article Five is not the only constitutionally-sanctioned
method for amending the Constitution. Akhil Reed Atnar, Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V:. 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 459-60 (arguing that Article Five merely
enumerates the ways that government actors may initiate constitutional reform, but that the
People may initiate it on their own). For a contrasting view, see David R. Dow, The Plain
Meaning of Article Five, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra, at 117 (criticizing Amar and
Ackerman's theories and insisting on Article Five as the exclusive means of amending the
Constitution).
360. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 6. One criticism of Ackerman's view is that it can be
used by its proponents to pick and choose moments that support their arguments. Bradley,
supra note 21, at 124 n.l56., For this and other criticisms, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW 215-28 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of
Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759 (1992); Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L~ REv. 1221 (1995).
361. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 40.
362. Id. at 266-67·.
363. ld. at 267.
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produce changes by working outside formal democratic procedures. In
addition to the Civil War and the New Deal, republican moments include
the Jeffersonian upsurge, the Age of Jackson, the Populist Era, and the
365
1960s. While also minimizing the role of the formal amendment process,
Professor Robert Lipkin took a slightly different approach, insisting that the
judiciary, rather than the people, is the true - engine of constitutional
366
revolution. Lipkin articulates a theory of constitutional change patterned
367
on Thomas Kuhn's formulation of scientific revolutions.
Periods
of
.
"normal adjudication" are interrupted by "revolutionary adjudication," in
which judges appeal to factors extrinsic to the Constitution in order to solve
368
a pressing moral or political problem. Finally, in a recent article, Professor
David A. Strauss dispensed with the significance of Article Five altogether,
369
arguing that constitutional amendments are simply irrelevant. According
to Strauss, not only does constitutional change occur without amendments,
but the amendments themselves are superfluous because they either ratify
an already existing constitutional order or they are simply ignored, as the
370
Fourteenth Amendment was ignored in the South for nearly a century.
In many ways, the Republican ascendancy in 1800 the beginning of
what Professor Pope calls the 'Jeffersonian upsurge" resembles the
contexts of other significant episodes of constitutional change. Realigning
371
elections often herald shifts in constitutional under.standings. Jefferson
was swept into office on_a popular tidal wave that nearly drowned the
372
Federalists. And once in office, Jefferson "was a stronger president than
373
either of his predecessors tried to be." According to biographer Dumas
Malone, Jefferson's influence in Congress remained unmatched until the
Wilson administration, and Congress passed "virtually no bills of any
374
.
.
fi
"
.
h
h.
I
s1gn1 1cance Wit out IS approva .
On the other hand, the Louisiana Purchase does not fit neatly into the
theories of constitutional change articulated by Ackerman or Pope because
there was no inter-branch conflict requiring the President and Congress to

ja1nes Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Pr1Jular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 292-93 (1990).
365. /d. at 312.
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701-02 (1989).
367. See THOMAS KUHN , THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 125 (2d ed. 1970) .
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1458-59 (200 1).
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work outside of the system through a call for support from the People.
Instead, the Purchase was made p.ossible by a triumph of the system. Because
the Supreme Court had not yet decided Marbury v. Madison and asserted its
376
.
.
f
th
c
.
.
•
prerogative as Interpreter o
e onstttutton, VIctory
at th e polls th e
Jeffersonian Republicans' overwhelming triumph in the 1800 electionssupplied all of the authority Jefferson needed to negotiate and ratify the
Louisiana treaty.
Nonetheless, the Louisiana treaty certainly wrought fun.d amental
constitutional change as defined by Professor Strauss: it affected "matters at
the core of what the written Constitution addresses," including "'t he
377
allocation of power between the federal government and the states." The
treaty affirmatively resolved the question of whether the treaty power
enabled the President and the Senate to bring vast new territory into the
United States and incorporate it into the Union as new states. Their
influence in the national government diluted, the original states, particularly
the northeastern ones, would never be the same. Moreover, once Jefferson
dropped his plans to declare most of the Louisiana Territory off limits to
setdement, the federal government now directly ruled a territory as vast as
that of the original thirteen states.
That jefferson and the Republicans authored this constitutional change
without relying on the amendment process is striking considering that they
had been the Article Five faithful. The adoption of the first ten amendments
relieved Republicans' anxieties about an. overreaching federal government
378
and offered proof that a workable system for constitutional reform existed.
Many Federalists ·shared this view. In his ·farewell address, George
Washington spoke of Article Five as preserving the sovereignty of the people:
"If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an
379
h.
h
h
c
.
.
d
.
"
.
h
amen d ment tn t e way w IC · t e onstttut1on es1gnates.
Also of particular importance to Republicans was Article· Five's
preservation of the balance between state and federal power~ Madison
argued in Federalist 39 that Article Five, in
•

requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the
proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the national and
advances towards the federal c·h aracter; in rendering th-e

375. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 10-12; Pope, supra note 364, at 291-92.
376. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 177, 177-78 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the
province and duty ·o f the judicial department, to say what the law is. . . . So, if a law be. in
opposition to the constitution; ... the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case ....").
377. Strauss, supra note 369, at 1469.
378. KYVIG, supra note 356, at 109.
379. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 A COMPilATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 205, 209 Qames D. Richardson ed., 1897) .
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concurrence of less than the whole number of states sufficient, it
380
loses again the federal and partakes of the national character.
•

The Article Five amendment process was, as Professor Ackerman
observed, a "state-centered medium," which ensured that a "national
consensus, no matter how broad or ·deep, would not generate higher law
unless the states, acting as states, gave their free and overwhelming
381
assent." The Eleventh Amendment, which directly overruled a decision of
the Supreme Cou·r t permitting states to be sued in federal court, seemed to
confirm for the Republicans that the constitutional amendment was an
382
important means of checking federal power and bolstering states' rights.
The Republicans' victory in 1800 was, Jefferson wrote, "as real a
revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its
383
form." Many rank and file Republicans believed their victory would initiate
a new round of constitutional reform in which the Article Five amendment
384
process would be used to limit federal power. Indeed, when Federalists
sought to deny Jefferson the presidency after the 1800 election resulted in
an electoral college tie between him and Aaron Burr, Jefferson threatened
to use the Republican majorities in the state legislatures to call for a
385
constitutional convention. As Jefferson recounted to James Monroe, this
threat was effective:
[T]hey were completely alarmed at the resource for which we
declared, to wit, a convention to re-organize the government, & to
•
amend it The word convention gives them the horrors, as in the
present democratical spirit of America, they fear they should lose
386
c.
·
•
1
f
h
c
.
.
.
some o f t h e1r tavortte morse so t e onstitutton.
In October 1801, just before the new Republican Congress began its
first session_, Edmund Pendleton published "The Danger Not Over," a
widely-read list of policies that he thought should be implemented to
387
complete the 1800 . revolution.
It called for several new constitutional
amendments to limit federal power, including one requiring a single-term

380. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 Uames Madison), supra note 15, at 246.
381. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 121.
382. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment's immediate effect was to overrule Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that the Constitution authorized the federal
courts to hear suits between a state and the citizen of another state or a foreign country).
383. Letter from Thomasjefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 JEFFERSON
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 140.
384. BANNING, supra note 78, at 281-82.
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THOUGHT 69-70 (1992).
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•
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 490, 491.
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presidency, shorter terms for U.S. Senators, and that both houses of
388
Congress, through simple majorities, approve treaties.
However, despite possessing strong majorities in Congress and in most
state legislatures, the Republicans managed to ·ratify only one amendment
during the Jefferson administration . the Twelftl) which was designed to
ensure that the electoral college snafu that tied up the presidential election
389
of 1800 would not be repeated in 1804. Of course, it is not surprising that
Jefferson would ignore the amendments proposed by the more radical
Republicans, for such changes would have crippled the national government
their party now controlled. But it is more puzzling why the Republicans
would fail to seek amendments to approve obvious expansions of federal
power beyond the limits set by a strict textual interpretation of the
Constitution. The most prominent of these expansions of federal power, the
Louisiana Purchase, set a bad precedent for supporters of states' rights and
limited federal power.
Indeed, the failure to seek an amendment for approving the Louisiana
Treaty triggered Article's V's fall into disuse. After the ratification of the
Twelfth Amendment in 1804, not a single amendment was ratified until the
Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 the longest period in the Constitution's
history in which it was not amended. Nor was the amendment process
seriously considered as a means of resolving the most important issues of the
day. Not until the thirty-sixth Congress in 1860 far too late were
amendments offered concerning Congressional power over slavery in the
territories, a question which had bedeviled Congress at least since 1820, and
390
which ·eventually helped to provoke secession.
While one proposed
amendment did come very close to ratification, coming up just one state
short, its significance would hardly have been earth-shattering. It would have
extended to all citizens, Article I, section 9' s ban on grants of "Emolument,
391
Office, or Title ... from any King, Prince, or Foreign State." In contrast,
proposed amendments that would have resolved disturbing ambiguities
concerning the relative power of the state and federal governments went
nowhere. Even strenuous efforts by Jefferson and Madison, when both were
out of office, failed to move Congress to propose amendments ratifying
expansions of federal power such as the authority to build internal

Edmund Pendleton, The Danger Not Ooer, RICHMOND EXAMINER, Oct. 20, 1801, quoted
in BANNING, supra note 78, at 282.
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392

improvements.
Having failed to push for constitutional amendments
during their respective presidencies, both Jefferson and Madison deserve
blame for the neglect of the Article Five process which both had praised as
the most important means of effecting constitutional change.
As historians point out, however, the· Supreme Court also played an
important role in the neglect of Article Five. The same year the Louisiana
Treaty was signed, the Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison, which
393
declared unconstitutional a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Later,
in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court took an expansive view of the federal
government's right to take actions "necessary and. proper" to carry out
394
textually-granted powers.
Professor David E. Kyvig argued that "these
steps .. ~ eroded the sense of amendment as the necessary solution to every
395
uncertainty about governmental authority." However, while judicial review
may have removed the need to call for a constitutional amendment each
time disputes about the meaning of the text arose, the Court was not wellpositioned to resolve fundamental disagreements about the scope of federal
and state power, or to protect the interests of the states. Indeed, the Court
did not strike down another exercise of federal power for another half
396
century, until Dredd Scott v. Sanford in 1857. Here, the Court's effort to
resolve a profound constitutional crisis over slavery in the territories, which
397
had paralyzed the political branches, failed spectacularly. Only during the
"Secession Winter" of 1860-61, after Abraham Lincoln had been elected
President and seven states had seceded from the Union, did Congress
seriously consider constitutional amendments to address the conflict over
398
slavery.
The failure to approve a constitutional amendment authorizing the
Louisiana Treaty weakened states' rights in two significant ways. First, it
confirmed that the federal government could fundamentally and
permanently alter the domestic relations among the states through the
treaty power. Second, it set a precedent for bypassing the Article Five
method of constitutional change, which gave the states a role equal to that
of Congress. The Louisiana Purchase thus laid the groundwork for two
subsequent significant expansions of federal power outside of the formal
amendment process Reconstruction and the New Deal.
While the Reconstruction Amendments the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
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395. KWIC, supra note 356, at 111.
396. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
397. The Court's decision created a firestorm of protest from antislavery forces and
"damaged for over a generation the Court's authority as an interpreter of the Constitution.''
BERNSTEIN, supra note 348, a.t 80.
398. BERNSTEIN, supra note 348, at 82-93.
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and Fifteenth marked a return to the formal method of constitutional
chan.g e, their ratification is mired in controversy. As Professor Strauss put it,
"The states of the Confederacy did not so much ratify the amendments as
submit to them because they were the defeated parties and had little
399
choice." The First Reconstruction Act blocked the readmission into the
Union of any of the Southern states until enough states ratified the
400
Fourteenth Amendment to make it part of the Constitution. Subsequent
Reconstruction Acts passed in the spring and summer of 1867 divided the
South ''into five military districts and placed the Union Army in control of
any further transition to statehood. Commanding generals were authorized
to call new constitutional 'conventions'~' after compiling voting registers that
401
enfranchised blacks and disenfranchised disloyal whites. Thus Professor
Ackerman calls the Reconstruction Amendments "amendments-simulcra"
because their ratification "made a hash" of the Article Five method:
Congress possessed an effective override of the states' right to veto the
amendments, telling Republican governments that a decision to reject
402
"deprived them of all political power in the councils of the nation."
According to Ackerman, the Reconstruction Amendments marked a shift
from the Framers' constitutional regime . expressed by the Article Five
treatment of the states and the federal government as co-equal partners in
constitutional change to a new regime in which the federal government
403
dominates constitutional change. While some scholars, such as Professor
John Harrison, have argued that the Reconstruction Amendments were
lawful, even Harrison admits that Article Five failed to adequately serve its
404
purpose of balancing principles of federalism and nationalism.
During the New Deal, another constitutional change that vastly
expanded federal power,. reformers abandoned even the pretext of l1Sing
Article Five. Through a series of election victories and the direct pressure of
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme, the President and Congress persuaded
the Supreme Court to produce decisions ratifying the reformers' vision of
405
activist government. Significantly, the states played no role, and Roosevelt
406
deliberately eschewed the Article Five process.
Thus, as Ackerman
concludes, the New ·Deal regime. "substituted a model of Presidential
leadership of national institutions for a model of assembly leadership based

399. Strauss, supta note 369, at 147~80.
400. First Reconstruction Act ch .. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867).
401. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 110.
402. /d. at 111.
403. Id.
404. See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REv.
375, 379 (2001).
405. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 269; William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin
D. Roosevelt s "Courl-Packing" Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 383-86 ( 1966).
406. Leuchtenberg, supra note 405, at 383-86; Strauss, supra note 369, at 1470.
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407

on a dialogue between the nation and the states." One hears in the New
Deal echoes of the Louisiana Purchase. Acting with broad popular support,
the President and the Congress instituted constitutional change the
expansion of federal power without resort to the Article Five method, even
when a constitutional amendment could have been approved and ratified
with relative ease.
The use of a constitutional amendment to ratify the Louisiana Treaty
would not necessarily have prevented the Civil War, or the Reconstruction
transformation that increased the power of the federal government, but it
would at least have reinf<?rced the importance of the states' role in
implementing constitutional change. Moreover, as Professor Stephen Griffin
summarized Jefferson's view, "[r]esort to amendment ensures that
significant changes in constitutional practice are clearly recognized and
408
openly debated.'' If Jefferson and his Republican successors had regularly
introduced amendments when seeking to expand the scope of federal
power, starting with the Louisiana Purchase, then the Article Five
amendment process would more likely have been seen later on as a way of
addressing the most controversial issues, including slavery in th·e territories.
A decision made through the amendment process would have had far more
legitimacy and staying power than single-branch solutions such as Scott v.
Sanford or the Missouri Compromise. Although the issue of slavery would
never have been satisfactorily resolved until it was eliminated, even a
decision by amendment to ratify the existence of slavery would have been
preferable to war; at least in the short term, because slavery could be
eliminated by the same peaceful means once the People were ready.
.

.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE TREA1YPOWER TODAY AND THE NATIONALIST VIEW

The Louisiana Purchase set a precedent for subsequent expansions of
federal power, and a corresponding reduction of states' rights, through
mere acts of the President and Congress. These expansions of federal power,
through interpretation alone, did not give the states a voice in deciding the
very constitutional changes that diminished each state's individual influence
as well as the influence of one geographical section of the nation. The
failure to seek a constitutional amendment left Jefferson's .popular
revolution incomplete and provided the means for its unraveling. Empire of
liberty federalism, while in its ascendancy, still faced the nagging questions
posed by the balance offorces federalism. The ultimate triumph of the empire of
liberty brand of states' rights destroyed the legitimacy of both, tied federalism
to slavery, and paved the way for the rise of an even stronger national
government.
407. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 271; Herbert Wechsler; The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the Natlonal Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559-60 & n.56 (1954).
408~
Griffin, supra note 359, at 42·.
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The world in which Thomas Jefferson and his Federalist opponents
struggled with the constitutional implications of a peacefully expanding
union seems distant from our own~ Today the prospects are obviously
remote that the United States will acquire territory large enough to disrupt
the balance among regional interests, nor is the nation likely to be bitterly
divided along sectional lines by a single issue. But it is important to
recognize that jefferson's con-c erns about the Louisiana Purchase arose, not
from a bizarrely-strict and already~bsolete vision of national power, but
from a desire to preserve the same core constitutional principles that are
now the subject ,o f a revival in the courts and intense debate in the academy.
These concerns transcend Jefferson and his oft-idiosyncratic constitutional
views, and would be just as valid were the U.S. now seeking to add new states
to the Union. The Louisiana Purchase demonstrated that the opponents of
the Constitution could not contemplate all of the ways in which the treaty
power might be used to undermine states' rights. Warnings in 1790 by the
Anti-Federalists that the federal government could, by treaty, sell portions of
a states' territory or cede
navigation
rights
crucial
to
a
states'
economy
were
•
simply the contemporary manifestations of a fear that the states'
independence, and their sovereignty, would be diminished or destroyed by
an overreaching federal government.
The harmful consequences of the Louisiana Purchase should cast doubt
on the prevailing view of the treaty power today the '"nationalist" view·409
which holds that its scope is broad. The anchor for this view is the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland, upholding the Migratory
Bird Treaty with Canada, which lower courts held unconstitutional when it
410
was enacted as ordinary legislation.
Most scholars assume from the
holding in Missouri that the President and the Senate, acting pursuant to the
Treaty Clause, can regulate matters· of traditional state concern where
411
Congress, acting under its Article I powers, cannot. The potential reach of
the treaty power is not limitless, however. The Supreme Court has held, and
scholars acknowledge, that the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment,
412
and other explicit constitutional limits constrain the treaty power. And a
treaty clearly must at least involve another foreign state; it cannot be a
413
sh am.,
409. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS'§ 303 cmt b (1986); HENKIN, supra
note 9, at 441; Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Po·wer Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1127,_1129 (1999) (arguing that the Court paid lip setVice to states' rights while in practice
federalism- placed "few meaningful limits on the treaty pow,e r"); Datnrosch, supra note 23, at
530; Griffin, supra note 359, at 42; Healy, supra note 21, at 1731.
410. 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see also supra note 23.
411. See REStATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS§ 303 cmt. c (1986); HENKIN, supra
note 9, at 442 n.2. But see Bradley, supra note 9, at 458-59.
412. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that a defendant's right to trial by
jury under the Sixth Amendment cannot be abrogated by the terms of a treaty); HENKIN, supra
note 9t at 141-56.
413. SeeGolove, supra note 21, at 1124.
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But within these hazy contours, disagreements over the intersection of
the treaty power with states' rights have not abated. Most advocates of the
nationalist view continue to maintain that, under Missouri v. Holland,
414
federalism limitations simply do not apply to exercises of the treaty power.
Professor David Golove recently argued for a modified nationalist view:
while the anti-commandeering principles recognized in New York v. United
415
416
States
and Printz v. United States apply to the treaty power, Eleventh
417
Amendment sovereign immunity may not. Moreover, Golove adds, even
the explicit Constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights and separation of
powers principles do not apply as rigidly to the treaty power: they may
"sometimes require a ... more forgiving construction when applied to
418
treaties." How this "more forgiving" approach would play out is, of course,
unclear until the Supreme Court considers a conflict between federalism
principles and the treaty power. What is clear, according to Golove, is that
the occasions where states' rights could interfere with the operation of a
.
l
41 9
treaty are excee d 1ng y rare.
While its full potential remains untapped, the treaty power today still
420
poses the threat to states' rights that the Anti-Federalists feared.
It is a
reserve of virtually unlimited federal power that even believers in strict
construction of the Constitution may find an irresistible means for carrying
out their policies. This was no more apparent than during the Louisiana
Purchase, when the Republicans, who had fought to presetve state
prerogatives against an encroaching national government during the
Federalist administrations, ratified and implemented the treaty despite its
powerful impact on the rights of the existing states.
As Professor John Yoo has pointed out, today's threats to state
sovereignty through uses of the treaty power are subtler, but no less real or
421
important. Ironically, it may fall to Jefferson's old enemy the courts to
414. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS§ 303 cmt. c (1986); HENKIN, supra
note 9, at 76.
415. 505 U.S. 144 ( 1992) (declaring invalid a statute comtnandeering state legislatures).
416. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring invalid a statute commandeering state executive
officials).
417. SeeGolove, supra note2I, at 1086--87; cJ. Bradley, supra note 9, at 391 (concluding that,
under the common interpretation of Missouri, '•the treaty power is immune from" the state
sovereign immunity). Compare John J. Gibbons, The .ftieventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1899-920 (1983) (arguing the Eleventh
An1endment did not protect states from suit~) brought under Article III to enforce treaties), and
William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1285-87 (1989) (similar), with Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth
and Eleventh Arrumdment.s, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 114-15 (1989) (arguing the opposite view).
418. Golove, supra note 21, at 1086.
419. !d. at 1085.
420. These fears are explored supra in Part II.
421. Yoo, supra note 22, at 1989 ("While n1odern [international] agreements do not
require the alienation of land or people to another government, they do call for something
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resist efforts by th.e political branches to circumvent federalism principles by
422
means of the treaty power.
Globalization puts great pressure on the
United States to conform to worldwide standards and delegate more
423
authority to international organizations. The battle over competing visions
of federalism waged during the Louisiana Purchase still holds a great deal of
424
relevance for the contemporary debates about the treaty power. Recalling
this two-hundred-year-old battle invites us to choose again between the
empire of liberty and the balance of forces. How will these profound changes in
the nature of the United States be given constitutional status in a process
that recognizes the sovereignty of the states as well as the national
government?
In an era of globalization, the ability of the states to preserve their
identities, and thus. preserve local accountability, will become more valuable
425
than ever. Balance offorces federalism ought to be dusted off, because this
vision of the Constitution preserves the interests of the existing states not
states in the abstract where real people live and work.

'

similar a sovereign nation's transfer of control over a certain type of conduct occurring with
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of states effectively to advocate for their interests in the national government. See Ku,. supra note
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